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The Air Force's dependence on the Internet continues to increase daily. The 
Internet has become a staple of the office environment along side the telephone, the fax 
machine, and the computer. However, this increased dependence comes with risks. 
The popularity and potential of the Internet attracts users with illegal as well as legal 
intentions. Since the Air Force considers the Internet an integral component of its 
Information Operations strategy, the Air Force must be confident that it can trust the 
security of this component. Therefore, reliable methods and information that helps the 
Air Force classify the risks associated with the Internet can help the Air Force determine 
the best processes to assure the security of its use of this resource. 
This thesis examines the computer and network attack taxonomies developed by 
John Howard. Howard developed the taxonomy to help him classify Internet security 
incidents as part of his doctoral research and as part of a follow-on project to develop a 
common language for computer security. The taxonomy is a possible method that the 
Air Force can use to help it classify Internet security attacks and incidents. 
This researcher concluded that the computer and network attack taxonomies 
were satisfactory. The questionnaire respondents appeared to prefer the 1998 version 
more. In addition, this study offers several areas of improvement to the taxonomy that 
can help it become more widely accepted. This researcher also concluded that 
organizations responsible for the collection and distribution of Internet security 
information, do explicitly collect some, but not all, information useful as input into the 
taxonomy. 
IX 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPUTER AND NETWORK ATTACK TAXONOMY 
I. Introduction 
The Internet 
Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm. Ralph Waldo 
Emerson (qtd. in Bartlett, 1980:497) 
In 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the US with its launch of the Sputnik satellite. 
This event convinced many in the US that despite its success during World War II and its 
newfound position as the world leader, the US had lost its footing to the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, in 1958 "Congress created the National Defense Education Act [...] essential 
for the training of tomorrow's scientists" (Moschovitis, 1999:34). This act resulted in the 
creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1958. ARPA, with 
millions in government funds, led the research and development of computers and 
information processing, to include the concept of "connecting computers across long 
distances" (Ibid.). 
By 1968, ARPA had become one of the premier research agencies in the world, 
and a central point of contact for anyone doing research concerning communications, 
computers, or information processing. However, sharing research information with all 
these interested parties was still an arduous task, since the US Postal Service was still 
the primary means used to transfer information from one area to another. This desire to 
find a better way to share information lead to ARPA's goal of connecting computers 
across long distances to allow the sharing of information. ARPA's breakthrough 
occurred when it submitted requests for proposals to build Interface Message 
Processors (IMP) that would "connect the individual sites, route messages, scan for 
errors, and confirm the arrival of messages at their destinations" (Moschovitis, 1999:61). 
These IMPs became the building blocks for today's computer networks, and ultimately 
the Internet. 
The birth of ARPAnet, which eventually became the Internet, occurred around 
September 1, 1969, in the shadow of the July 20,1969 lunar landing. ARPA 
successfully networked IMPs located at the University of California at Los Angeles, the 
University of California at Santa Barbara, the University of Utah, and the Stanford 
Research Institute, thereby establishing the "foundation for advanced networking and 
breaks a path toward the Internet" (Moschovitis, 1999:61). However, this technological 
achievement received little fanfare, since the world still reveled in the lunar landing that 
occurred a few months earlier. 
ARPA maintained control of the Internet for the next 20 years, with the DOD, 
research centers, and universities around the country as its primary users. In 1986, the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) expanded the ARPAnet by developing a network 
that allowed non-defense related users to be connected to the Internet (Moschovitis, 
1999:125). The NSFnet dramatically increased the private sector's access to, and use 
of the Internet. The Internet community had grown beyond the wildest dreams of its 
developer, ARPA, and its maintainer, the US government. In an effort to keep pace with 
the demands on its use and to integrate evolving technology into the Internet, ARPA 
decommissioned ARPAnet in 1990, removed its original nodes from the Internet, and re- 
routed all traffic to the more robust and modern NSFnet backbone, maintained by the 
Michigan Educational Research Information Triad (MERIT), IBM and MCI (Abbate, 
1999:196). 
The NSFnet backbone opened Internet access to the commercial world. As the 
number of commercial users increased, so did the various types of uses of the Internet. 
The DOD, research centers, and universities quickly saw their exclusivity on the Internet 
disappear, as communications companies, computer companies, cutting edge 
businesses, entrepreneurs, and the public began getting connected. Although the US 
government still maintained control over the Internet, via the NSF, it began to encounter 
difficulty in maintaining the Internet in response to its growing user community. 
Therefore, the NSF relinquished control of the Internet to better facilitate the integration 
of new technologies. In 1994, the NSF issued a plan that would allow competitive 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) to operate their Internet service backbone and provide 
access to the public. These commercial backbones eventually became the replacement 
for NSFnet, thereby privatizing and commercializing the entire Internet. "On 30 April 
1995, MERIT formally terminated the old NSFnet backbone, ending the US government 
ownership of the Internet" (Abbate, 1999:199). However, the Air Force's dependence on 
the Internet did not diminish due to its privatization and commercialization. In fact, it 
increased, along with the world's desire to be connected. 
My January 1999, the US military had approximately one million hosts connected 
to the Internet (Moschovitis, 1999:278). A host is "any computer on a network that is a 
repository for services available to other computers on the network" (Department of the 
Air Force, AFDIR33-303, 1999:37). Describing the Air Force's increasing numbers of 
hosts connected to the Internet as extraordinary, may be extreme, however in relation to 
the growth of the Internet itself, it is not. Using phenomenal to describe the Internet may 
be an understatement, but it does capture the essence as represented by Figure 1: 
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(ISC, Internet Domain Survey: July 2000, 2000) 
Figure 1 - Growth of Internet via Number of Hosts Connected 
In addition, the Internet phenomenon expands well beyond the US borders. 
Originally designed to meet the needs of the DOD, the Internet now supports users from 
around the world. The Information Age indicator, Internet hosts per 10,000 people, of 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) 1999, clearly illustrates this expansion. Figure 
2 graphically illustrates this data point. 







Figure 2 - Internet Hosts per 10,000 People (Top Five Countries), as of July 1998 
Of course, the primary access method to the Internet, personal computers, experienced 
phenomenal growth to match the growth of the Internet. Once again, the Information 
Age indicator of the World Development Indicators 1999 clearly illustrates the extremely 
large number of personal computers worldwide. Figure 3 graphically illustrates this data 
point. 
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Figure 3 - Personal Computers per 1,000 People (Top Five Countries), as of 1998 
The Internet provides seamless connectivity to networks throughout most of the 
developed world, continues to grow at a phenomenal rate, and is the heart and soul of 
the information technology era. However, it does not come without risk. John M. 
Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency, stated this quite succinctly in his 
1996 testimony to the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, "I, like many others in this room, am concerned that 
this connectivity and dependency make us vulnerable to a variety of information warfare 
attacks" (Deutch, 1996). 
Information Superiority 
Information has long been an integral component of human competition- 
those with a superior ability to gather, understand, control, and use 
information have had a substantial advantage on the battlefield. 
(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:i) 
The importance of information to warfighting led the Air Force to the realization 
that information is a crucial offensive and defensive resource. Along with land, sea, air, 
and space operations, information operations (IO) now constitutes the "fifth dimension of 
warfare" (Fogleman, 1995). In recognition of this distinction, the Air Force identified 
information superiority as a core competency. Information superiority is "the degree of 
dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, 
control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition" (Department of the 
Air Force, AFDD 2-5,1998:2). The Air Force explicitly stated its commitment to 
information superiority by stating, "while Information Superiority is not the Air Force's 
sole domain, it is, and will remain, an Air Force core competency" (Department of the Air 
Force, Global, 1996). Figure 4 illustrates how the Air Force envisions the integrated 





Gain I Exploit 
ISR 
Weather 
Precision Navigation & Positioning 
Other Information Collection/ 
Dissemination Activities 
Information Warfare 

















(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:3) 
Figure 4 - Air Force Information Superiority Construct 
To successfully deploy a superiority strategy, Sun Tzu identified the following 
"prerequisites for combat commanders" (Huang, 1993:66): 
• Plan, but know the calculation of gains and losses 
• Mobilize, but know the causes for action and inaction 
• Control, but know lethal and safe terrains 
• Fight, but know where there are sufficiencies and deficiencies 
Since the Air Force considers IO a new dimension of war, and plans to implement an 
information superiority strategy, these prerequisites should apply. Unfortunately, the 
lack of quantifiable, repeatable method of describing Internet security risks in relation to 
these prerequisites appears to be a weak link in Air Force's information superiority 
strategy. Without this information, how can the Air Force effectively plan, mobilize, 
control, and fight in this new dimension? 
To add to this weak link, the Air Force knows its adversaries are also working on 
10 strategies. According to Dr. Wess Roberts, author of Leadership Secrets of Attila the 
Hun, commanders should "not underestimate the power of an enemy, no matter how 
great or small, to rise against you on another day" (Roberts, 1985:58). The Air Force 
holds commanders accountable for the posture and execution of Defensive 
Counterinformation (DCI) within their commands. DCI "includes those actions that 
protect information, information systems, and information operations from any potential 
adversary" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5,1998:10). Unfortunately, the free 
flowing nature of the Internet, added to the changing face of the threats, make 
commanders' jobs even harder. As stated in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5 
Information Operations (AFDD 2-5), "terrorists, criminals, and hackers are becoming 
more of a threat as they discover the benefits of using the electronic environment to 
accomplish their goals" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:6). 
The Problem 
My greatest concern is that hackers, terrorist organizations, or other 
nations might use information warfare techniques as part of a coordinated 
attack designed to seriously disrupt: 
• Infrastructures such as electric power distribution, air traffic 
control, or financial sectors; 
• International commerce; and 
• Deployed military forces in time of peace or war. (Deutch, 1996) 
Mr. Deutch's words are very relevant today. As the Air Force's dependence on 
the Internet continues to grow, so do concerns about Internet security. Global 
Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, which is part of the National 
Security Strategy, contains these unambiguous words in reference to the information 
superiority core competency: 
Information Operations, and Information Warfare (IW) in particular, will grow 
in importance during the 21st Century. The Air Force will aggressively 
expand its efforts in defensive IW as it continues to develop its offensive IW 
capabilities. The top IW priority is to defend our own increasingly 
information-intensive capabilities [...] on the offensive side, the Air Force 
will emphasize operational and tactical IW and continue, in conjunction with 
other Federal agencies, to support strategic information operations. 
(Department of the Air Force, Global Engagement, 1996) 
The Air Force provides even more reasons to develop a reliable, repeatable process to 
classify Internet security incidents because of its goal for Internet use within the service. 
According to the Air Force Instruction 33-129 Transmission of Information via the 
Internet, "the Air Force goal for the Internet is to provide maximum availability at 
acceptable risk levels for Air Force members needing access for the execution of official 
business" (Department of the Air Force, AFI33-129, 1999:3). Therefore, developing a 
process to classify Internet security incidents must advance beyond scientific guesses. 
The Air Force should support and encourage sound research to ensure it, as well as its 
members, recognizes Internet security incidents and can classify them accordingly. 
In 1997, John D. Howard submitted his dissertation, An Analysis of Security 
Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1996, to Carnegie Mellon University as part of his 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Engineering and Public Policy. 
Howard explained that he was curious about the Internet and its security because many 
reputable people had stated that the Internet, although wondrous, was very insecure and 
dangerous. Yet, it was hard to find quantifiable evidence to support this fact. Thus, 
Howard began his research based on the premise: 
Security is a problem on the Internet. The thousands of successful break- 
ins over the years are a testimony to that. But just how much of a problem 
is it? The answer to this question is important for two reasons. First, with 
information about Internet security problems, we could determine to what 
extent, and in what areas, government programs and policies should be 
instituted to devote society's resources to protecting the Internet. Second, 
trends over time could be used to determine the effectiveness of these 
policies and resources. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:1) 
However, as Howard embarked on his research, he discovered that although many lists 
of terms, lists of categories, tables, matrices, and taxonomies existed focusing on 
computer and network attacks, they proved inadequate for his needs. According to 
Howard: 
The taxonomy developed as part of this research is broader in scope than 
Landwher, et al., because it does not attempt to enumerate all computer 
security flaws, or to enumerate all possible methods of attack, but rather 
attempts to provide a broad, inclusive framework. The intention was to 
reorient the focus of the taxonomy toward a process, rather than a single 
classification category, in order to provide both an adequate classification 
scheme for Internet attacks, and also a taxonomy that would aid in thinking 
about computer and network security. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:60) 
Eventually, Howard developed his computer and network attack taxonomy shown in 
Figure 5. 
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(Howard, Analysis, 1997:73) 
Figure 5 -1997 Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy 
Although Howard's taxonomy focused on attacks, he subsequently used his 
taxonomy to classify incidents during his study. He defined attacks as "a single 
unauthorized access attempt, or unauthorized use attempt, regardless of success" 
10 
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:287) and defined incidents as "a group of attacks that can be 
distinguished from other incidents because of the distinctiveness of the attackers, and 
the degree of similarity of sites, techniques, and timing" (lbid.:289). However, more 
important is that the taxonomy was developed from: 
[...] a process or operational viewpoint. From this viewpoint, an attacker on 
computers or networks attempts to link to ultimate objectives or motivations. 
This link is established through an operational sequence of tools, access, 
and results that connects these attackers to their objectives [...] (Ibid.:71) 
Therefore, Howard's taxonomy is more than a listing of information, its attempts to 
describe the process of computer and network attacks. 
Approximately one year after publishing his dissertation containing the original 
computer and network attack taxonomy, Howard and Longstaff published a new version, 
illustrated in Figure 6, in the 1998 Sandia National Laboratories Report titled A Common 
Language for Computer Security Incidents. According to Howard and Longstaff: 
Finally, it is hoped that by demonstrating the utility of this particular 
representation for incident data, other response teams could structure 
incident in the same taxonomy, facilitating the sharing of information and 
allowing a more complete and accurate analysis of security incidents 
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(Howard and Longstaff, 1998:16) 
Figure 6 -1998 Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy, 1998 
This thesis examines the computer and network attack taxonomies developed by 
Howard. Howard developed the taxonomies to help him classify Internet security attacks 
and incidents as part of his doctoral research and as part of a follow-on project to help 
develop a common language for the computer security. A resulting recommendation 
included continued evaluation of the computer and network taxonomies to make 
practical modifications. This continued evaluation may lead to its wider acceptance by 
the Internet security community, as well as maintain the taxonomies' currency due to the 
dynamic nature of the Internet. In addition, this analysis exposes the Air Force to a 
possibly better method to classify Internet security attacks and incidents. Finally, this 
thesis adds to the body of knowledge with respect to Internet security and other related 
12 
disciplines, such as computer security, information security, communication security, 
information assurance, and information warfare. 
Research Overview 
The remaining chapters of this thesis provide the details of this research. 
Chapter II contains the literature review, which explores the existing body of knowledge 
pertinent to this research topic. Chapter III describes the method used and assumptions 
made while analyzing the data. Chapter IV provides the findings of the analysis 
performed on the data. Finally, Chapter V discusses the findings, presents conclusions, 
and makes recommendations for further research in this area. 
13 
II. Literature Review 
If it keeps up, man will atrophy all his limbs but the push-button finger. 
Frank Lloyd Wright (qtd. in Quoteland.com, 2000) 
The Internet and Society 
As indicated by Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, the phenomenal growth of the 
Internet means that people, states, and countries believe in this information technology 
resource. The Internet, the information superhighway, provides the backbone for the 
electronic exchange of information around the world, with the US being a major user and 
developer. According to the Science & Engineering Indicators - 2000 compiled by the 
National Science Board (NSB), "the revolution in information technology (IT) has been 
likened to the industrial revolution in terms of its potential scope" (NSB, 2000:9-4). The 
NSB is: 
Responsible, by law, for developing on a biennial basis, a report"[...] on 
indicators of the state of science and engineering in the United States." 
The Science and Engineering Indicators series was designed to provide a 
broad base of quantitative information about U.S. science, engineering, and 
technology for use by public and private policymakers. (NSB, 2000:xiv; 
NSF, 2000) 
The NSB recognized the impact of IT to American society and dedicated an entire 
chapter of the Science & Engineering Indicators - 2000 to the subject. 
The NSB defined IT as an integration of "three key technologies: digital 
computing, data storage, and the ability to transmit digital signals through 
telecommunications networks" (NSB, 2000:9-5). The statistics generated by the NSB 
gives credibility to the existence of an IT revolution. The NSB clearly states that: 
The U.S. economy approaches the end of the 20th century with 
unprecedented real growth, miniscule inflation, low un-employment, and 
strong consumer and investor confidence. Economists have dubbed it the 
"Cinderella economy." The reasons for this success are many and varied. 
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However, it can be argued that technological change has been behind the 
economic boom of the late 1990s. (NSB, 2000:2-6) 
The NSB broadened the scope of IT by using the term high technology, as defined by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD 
contains 29 member countries, which includes the US, and is "an organisation that, most 
importantly, provides governments a setting in which to discuss, develop and perfect 
economic and social policy" (OECD, 2000). The OECD identified four industries as high 
technology based on their research and development (R&D) intensities: aerospace, 
computers and office machinery, electronics-communications, and pharmaceuticals" 
(NSB, 2000:7-4; Sakurai, Evangelos, and Papaconstantinou 1996:38). 
Percent 
100 
High-technology   Knowledge-based Other 
manufacturing      service industries    manufacturing 
industries industries 
(NSB, 2000:7-6) 
Figure 7 - Avg. Annual Rates of Growth in Three U.S. Economic Sectors: 1980 - 97 
This high technology sector experienced the most growth during the past two decades, 
as illustrated by Figure 7. More importantly, three of the industries that comprise high 
technology, aerospace, computers and office machinery, and electronics- 
communications, play substantial roles in the defense industry. 
Figure 8 illustrates more vividly the influence high technology industries have on 
the current US economic boom. Venture capital firms invested $16.8 billion dollars in 
1998. High technology firms that developed computer software or offered software 
15 
services garnered top billing by receiving 33 percent of the investments. 
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(NSB, 2000:7-25) 
Figure 8 - U.S. Venture Capital Disbursements, By Industry Category: 1988 & 1999 
In short, the Science & Engineering Indicators - 2000 clearly illustrate that: 
The United States continues to lead or be among the leaders in all major 
technology areas. Advancements in information technologies (computers 
and telecommunications products) continue to influence new technology 
development and to dominate technical exchanges between the United 
States and its trading partners. (NSB, 2000:7-3) 
The NSB provided a more succinct comment on the impact of information technology, 
"information technology has had an impact on virtually all sectors of our economy and 
society, including the conduct of research, as well as our daily lives" (NSB, 2000:1-39). 
The economic status of the US clearly shows that high technology industries 
played a major role in the current economic boom. Yet, they do not indicate the role the 
Internet played. The term Internet is a "catch-all term used to describe the massive 
worldwide network of computers. Literally it means network of networks, and is a 
16 
worldwide interconnection of individual networks operated by government, industry, 
academia, and private sectors" (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR33-303, 1999:105). 
Due to the nebulous nature of the Internet, quantifying its role in the current economic 
boom is difficult. However, the NSB does predict that: 
Technological change is expected to continue to transform many aspects of 
economic production, distribution, and consumption. Such changes 
include, for example, further development of Internet commerce (e.g., 
banking and retail operations), additional advances in biotechnology (e.g., 
"designer" drugs), greater automation in production (e.g., advanced robotic 
systems), new forms of household entertainment (e.g., digital video disc 
entertainment systems), and new ways of conducting scientific research 
itself (e.g., the creation of virtual laboratories). (NSB, 2000:2-6) 
Consequently, if indicators show that high technology is the juggernaut behind the US' 
current economic boom, to include the Internet, then analyzing Internet security to 
maintain society's confidence in this technology such be of utmost importance. Part of 
this analysis includes the ability to clearly and consistently identify security issues and 
threats. 
Although the statistics referenced thus far provide a telling story on the impact of 
the Internet in the US, the statistics derived from the population at large provides a more 
breathtaking picture. The NSB documented several Internet related trends, which 
includes: 
• Internet-based electronic commerce is growing rapidly and changing the 
impact of IT on the economy. Private market research firms estimated 
that the value of transactions conducted over the Internet will reach $1 
trillion by 2003 (up from $40-100 billion in 1998). (NSB, 2000:9-3) 
• Schools are rapidly connecting to the Internet. By 1998, 89 percent of 
public schools were connected to the Internet (up from 35 percent in 
1994). (Ibid.:93) 
• Colleges are increasingly using IT in instructions. The percentage of 
college courses using e-mail, Internet resources, class Web pages, and 
other forms of information technology in instruction increased rapidly 
between 1994 and 1998. (Ibid.:93) 
17 
•    Governments around the world are using the Internet and the World Wide 
Web to communicate with constituencies. ((Ibid.:93) 
Additional trends clearly indicate that US citizens consider the Internet a staple 
ingredient in their homes and work centers. For example, "the number of people without 
access to a computer either at home or at work fell substantially between 1983 and 
1999_fr0m 70 percent down to 34 percent" (NSB, 2000:8-2). Furthermore, the 
increased access to computers in homes and work centers also increased Internet and 
computer usage, as illustrated in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 - Computer Usage: Average Hours Per Year: 1995,1997,1999 
The Internet, without doubt, plays an important role for many Americans. It may 
be difficult to quantify its importance, however the Science & Engineering Indicators - 
2000 implies that it is very important: 
• In 1999, for the first time ever, a majority (54 percent) of American adults 
had at least one computer in their homes. (NSB, 2000:8-2) 
• Approximately one-third of Americans subscribed to an on-line service 
and had home e-mail addresses in 1999. (lbid.:8-2) 
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Since American society places such a high value on access to the Internet, Internet 
security has inevitably become important too. Along that line, since the DOD protects 
and defends the US from all enemies, foreign and domestic, the DOD must address 
Internet security since it has now become a valued domestic resource. More 
specifically, the Air Force must address Internet security since the Air Force considers 
the Internet a valued resource too, as it continues to integrate the Internet into its daily 
worldwide operations. 
The Internet and the Air Force 
According to Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, the post- 
Cold War Air Force considers "information as a weapon/target" (Department of the Air 
Force, Global Engagement, 1996). The Air Force considers information such a valuable 
weapon/target, that it added information superiority as a core competency. The Air 
Force stated: 
Today, more than ever, gaining and maintaining information superiority is a 
critical task for commanders and an important step in executing the 
remaining Air Force core competencies. The execution of information 
operations in air, space, and, increasingly, in "cyberspace" constitutes the 
means by which the Air Force does its part to provide information 
superiority to the nation, joint force commander, and Service component 
and coalition forces. (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5,1998:i) 
The Air Force's belief in information superiority resulted in it developing its own 
construct, as illustrated in Figure 4, to pursue, achieve, and integrate information 
superiority into other aspects of the Air Force environment. 
Although the Air Force Information Superiority Construct explicitly affects the Air 
Force's information systems, the Air Force realizes that the information infrastructure 
"transcends industry, the media, and the military and includes both government and 
nongovernment entities" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:4). The term 
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information infrastructure refers to the link between "individual information systems 
through numerous and redundant direct and indirect paths, including space-based 
systems" (lbid.:4). These redundant direct and indirect paths include the Internet. The 
Air Force more narrowly defines the components of the Internet that supports its mission 
as the Defense Information Infrastructure (DM), the National Information Infrastructure 
(Nil), and the Global Information Infrastructure (Gil). 
The Dll is: 
The web of communications networks, computers, software, databases, 
applications, and other services that meet the information processing and 
transport needs of DOD users, across the range of military operations. The 
Dll includes the information infrastructure of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Defense agencies, and the combatant commands. It provides 
information processing and services to subscribers over the Defense 
Information System Network and includes command and control, tactical, 
intelligence, and commercial communications systems used to transmit 
DOD information. The Dll is embedded within and deeply integrated into 
the National Information Infrastructure. Their seamless relationship makes 
distinguishing between them difficult. (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR 
33-303, 1999:75) 
The Dll transcends the US military and civilian sectors, which is a compelling reason to 
why analyzing Internet security activity is so important. How does this compare to the 
Nil? 
The Nil is: 
The nationwide interconnection of communications networks, computers, 
databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of 
information available to users. The Nil encompasses a wide range of 
communications and information equipment, systems, and networks, 
including the personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted 
information. The Nil is similar in nature and purpose to the Global 
Information Infrastructure but relates in scope only to a national information 
environment, which includes all government and civilian information 
infrastructures. (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR 33-303, 1999:119- 
120) 
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Similar to the DM, the Nil's definition reiterates the tight coupling of the government and 
public information resources. The interrelationship between the DM and Nil leads to the 
next level of information infrastructure integration, the Gil. 
The Gil is: 
The worldwide interconnection of communications networks, computers, 
databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of 
information available to users. It encompasses a wide range of 
communications and information equipment, systems, and networks, to 
include the personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted 
information. (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR 33-303,1999:94) 
The DM definition uses the word web as a metaphor for the interconnectivity provided by 
the Internet. The Nil and Gil actually include interconnection within their definition, 
which also refers to the Internet. Therefore, the Internet, from the Air Force's 
perspective, consists of the interconnected Dll, Nil, and Gil, as illustrated in Figure 10. 
These information infrastructures provide the worldwide connectivity used by the Air 
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Figure 10 - DM, Nil, and Gil Interfaces 
An insecure Internet as illustrated by Figure 10, poses a threat to the Air Force. 
AFDD 2-5 provided the following description of the interaction between the Dll, Nil, and 
Gil: 
In reality, a news broadcast, a diplomatic communique, and a military 
message ordering the execution of an operation all depend on the Gil. 
(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:5) 
Therefore, any breach of security, any vulnerability that an adversary can use to its 
advantage to disrupt or taint this order, can cause untold damage to the US and its 
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Allies. Thus, analyzing Internet security incidents to clearly and consistently identify 
threats gain importance as the Air Force becomes more dependent on the Internet. 
Information systems and the Internet provide a new dimension of warfare for the 
Air Force. It provides a mechanism and equalizer for our adversaries too, especially the 
less advanced and wealthy, to take action against the US. For the cost of a personal 
computer and Internet access, along with the desire and the technological knowledge, 
advisories worldwide can exploit known Internet vulnerabilities to harm the US, as 
illustrated in Figure 11: 
(JCS, 1998:1-16) 
Figure 11 - Emerging IO and Technology 
The Air Force voiced its concerns about this issue by stating: 
Just as the United States plans to employ IO against its adversaries, so 
too can it expect adversaries to reciprocate. Numerous countries have 
discovered the benefits of IO. They employ psychological operations 
(PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and military deception and now are 
collecting available intelligence via the Internet and creating malicious 
code and hacking cells. Terrorists, criminals, and hackers are becoming 
more of a threat as they discover the benefits of using the electronic 
environment to accomplish their goals. (Department of the Air Force, 
AFDD 2-5, 1998:6) 
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The Air Force should be concerned about these threats, since the Dll, Nil, and Gil all 
represent portions of the Internet. 
These threats continue to concern the Air Force. Table 1 lists threats that the Air 
Force believes pose risks to systems that rely on information technology. These threats 
pose risks for "both stand-alone and networked weapon and support systems [...] these 
threats can be employed by both organized entities, such as nation-states, and 
unstructured threats, such as rogue computer hackers" (Department of the Air Force, 
AFDD 2-5, 1998:7). 
Table 1 - Information Warfare Threats 
Compromise Deception/ Corruption Denial/Loss Destruction 
•    Malicious Code •    Malicious Code •    Malicious Code •    System 
•    System •    System Intrusion •    Bombs Intrusion 
Intrusion •    Military Deception •    Directed Energy •    Lasers 
•    Psychological •    Spoofing •    Weapons •    Physical Attack 
Ops •    Imitation •    Lasers •    Nuclear & Non- 
•    Intel Collection •    Physical Attack nuclear EMP 
•    Technology •    Nuclear & Non- •    Virus Insertion 
Transfer nuclear EMP •    System 
•    Software Bugs •    Chemical/ Overload 
•    Biological •    Radio 
•    Warfare Frequency 
•    Jamming 
(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:6) 
Once again, the information warfare threats do not explicitly mention the Internet, 
however the many of the information warfare threats can occur via the Internet. 
The risks posed by the information warfare threats provide enough motivation to 
develop a process to clearly and consistently classify Internet security attacks and 
incidents. According to Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century: 
Information Operations, and Information Warfare (IW) in particular, will grow 
in importance during the 21st Century. The Air Force will aggressively 
expand its efforts in defensive IW as it continues to develop its offensive IW 
capabilities. The top IW priority is to defend our own increasingly 
information-intensive capabilities. 
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Nevertheless, the Air Force provides another motivator with respect to its focus on 
defensive counterinformation (DCI). DCI includes information assurance, operational 
security, counterdeception, counterintelligence, counterpsychological operations, and 
electronic protection. According to AFDD 2-5, "DCI is the Air Force's overall top priority 
within the information warfare arena. Commanders are accountable for DCI posture and 
execution within their commands" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:7). 
Therefore, this statement implies that Internet security should also be a top priority not 
only for the Air Force generally, but for Air Force commanders specifically. As such, 
being able to clearly and consistently identify the threats to Air Force information and 
information systems is a necessity. 
As the Air Force continues to integrate its daily operations with the Internet, 
analyzing Internet security incidents becomes more important. The Air Force Research 
Laboratory in Rome, New York recently announced its participation in the DOD's $50 
million research project of the Next Generation Internet (NGI). In his explanation of the 
purpose of the NGI, Secretary of Defense William Cohen reiterated the importance of 
the Internet to the military and the public: 
"Internet technology was first demonstrated by the military in the 1970s and 
is the foundation of today's military and commercial network systems," said 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen. "The military must stay ahead in 
information technologies to dominate in the future. The Next Generation 
Internet program will enable revolutionary capabilities of importance to both 
the Department of Defense and the nation as a whole." (AFN, AFRL, 2000) 
Therefore, analyzing Internet security incidents, with respect to the current technology, 
will be helpful as the Air Force participates in the development of the NGI. 
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The Research Agenda 
Given the growing dependence upon the Internet by the American citizens in 
general, and the Air Force in particular, the body of knowledge that addresses Internet 
security remains small. To address this issue, which crosses the boundaries of several 
areas of expertise, such as, computer and communications security, software 
engineering, fault-tolerance, systems design and implementation, and networking, 
among others, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) charted the Committee on Information Systems 
Trustworthiness. DARPA and the NSA requested the committee to "examine, discuss, 
and report on interrelated issues associated with the research, development, and 
commercialization of technologies for trustworthy systems and to use its assessment to 
develop recommendations for research to enhance information systems trustworthiness" 
(Schneider, et al, 1999:viii). The committee included experts from the previously listed 
areas of expertise, as well as the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 
the Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, and the National 
Research Council; a who's who in information technology and research. 
The Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness focused on networked 
information systems (NIS). The Committee defined NIS as integrated "computing 
systems, communications systems, people (both as users and operations); procedures, 
and more" (Schneider, et al, 1999:2). It also defined trustworthiness as: 
Assurance that a system deserves to be trusted—that it will perform as 
expected despite environmental disruptions, human and operator error, 
hostile attacks, and design and implementation errors. Trustworthy 
systems reinforce the belief that they will continue to produce expected 
behavior and will not be susceptible to subversion. (Ibid.:316) 
26 
The primary NISs subjected to this study were the public telephone system (PTN) and 
the Internet due to their extremely large size, dependence upon each other, society's 
dependence upon the PTN, and society's growing dependence upon the Internet. 
The committee openly admits that the title of their final report, Trust in 
Cyberspace, is intentionally ambiguous. The report notes: 
One reviewer, contemplating the present, suggested that a question mark 
be placed at the end of the title to raise questions about the 
trustworthiness of cyberspace today. And this is a question that the 
report does raise. (Schneider, et al, 1999:viii) 
Regardless of the interpretation of the title's meaning, one of the conclusions developed 
by the committee was that more research is needed in this area. They offered several 
conclusions and recommendations pertinent to this study, and future studies, into the 
overarching area of information technology in their final report, published in 1999: 
• [...] absent scientific studies that measure dominant detractors of NIS 
trustworthiness, it its hard to know what vulnerabilities are the most significant 
or how resources might best be allocated in order to enhance a system's 
trustworthiness. (Schneider, et al, 1999:15) 
• Rigorous empirical studies of systems outages and their causes are a 
necessary ingredient of any research agenda intended to further NIS 
trustworthiness. (Ibid.:15) 
• Security research during the past few decades has been based on formal 
policy models that focus on protecting information from unauthorized access 
by specifying which users should have access to data or other systems 
objects. It is time to challenge this paradigm of "absolute security" and move 
toward a model built on three axioms of insecurity: insecurity exists; insecurity 
cannot be destroyed; and insecurity can be moved around. (Ibid.:247) 
• The premise of this report is that a "trust gap" is emerging between the 
expectations of the public (along with parts of government) and the 
capabilities of NISs. (Ibid.:21) 
• Hostile attacks are the fastest-growing source of NIS disturbances. 
Indications are that this trend will continue and that, because they can be 
coordinated attacks are potentially the most destabilizing form of 
trustworthiness breach. (Ibid.:22) 
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• A few university computer science departments have several faculty 
members who emphasize computer security research, but many departments 
have none who do. In any event, the number of computer security 
researchers is small compared to the number in other specialties [...]. 
(Ibid.:235). 
• DARPA is generally effective in its interactions with the research community, 
but DARPA needs to increase its focus on information security and NIS 
trustworthiness research, especially with regard to long-term efforts. 
(Ibid.:254) 
• An increase in expenditures for research in information security and NIS 
trustworthiness is warranted. (Ibid.:255) 
As illustrated by the previous information, American society's dependence on the 
Internet continues to grow, as well as Air Force's dependence. However, the scientific 
and empirical research required identify and classify security issues continue to lag. 
"Articulating an agenda for that research" (Schneider, et al, 1999:13) was a goal of the 
Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness. Beneficiaries of this agenda 
include researchers, policymakers, NIS operators, and product developers, all of whom 
have a stake in the findings resulting from this research agenda. 
The Reality of Internet Security Incidents 
Given the growing dependence on the Internet and the lack of research focused 
on Internet security activity, how can one determine the prevalence of Internet security 
incidents? Due to national security concerns by the DOD and liability concerns of the 
public, quantifying an answer remains elusive. However, by gleaning publicly accessible 
resources, it certainly suggests that a problem exists. Table 2 provides some insight into 
Internet security incidents. Obviously, the list is not all-inclusive. Nonetheless, it does 
illustrate that all Internet users are potential victims of Internet security incidents and the 
Air Force would not be the sole beneficiary of analyzing these events. 
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Table 2 ■ List of Publicly Known Internet Security Incidents 
Internet Security 
Incident Description Source 
Air Force home page 
hacked 
Vandalism and data destruction (AFN, Hacker, 2000) 
Computer attacks Numerous computer attacks via 
the Internet against DOD 
computer systems occur daily. 
(GAO, T-AIMD-96-92, 1996) 
Computer based 
crimes 
Various hacking, data mischief, 
theft and copyright violations 
occur via the Internet 





Intentional attack on 
commercial web sites that 
denied access to legitimate 
users and customers. 




Vandalism, defacing, and 
distributed-denial-of-service to 
various Federal web sites 
(GAO, T-AIMD-99-223, 1999) 
ILOVEYOU virus Destructive email virus that 
does various damage to 
infected computers 
(GAO, T-AIMD-00-171, 2000) 
Intrusions Various DOD computers victim 
of unauthorized access 
attempts 
(AFN, DOD, 2000) 
10 attack Speculation that the US 
conducted 10 attacks against 
Serbia and Kosovo during 78- 
day war in 1999 
(Brewin, 1999) 
Melissa virus Destructive macro virus that 
affected Microsoft Word 2000 
and Word 97. 
(GAO, T-AIMD-99-146, 1999) 
Public posting of 
computer hacker 
tools 
The availability of computer 
hacker tools on the Internet 
continues to grow 
(GAO, T-AIMD-96-108, 1996) 
Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany website 
hacked 
Vandalism and defacing of 
website 
(AFN, Hacker, 2000) 
Solar Sunrise 
incident 
Four days of hacker intrusions 
into DOD computer systems 
(United States Senate, 1998) 
Use of Zombies 
during DDOS attacks 
Hijack of commercial servers 





DOD computer systems victim 
on continuous hacker attacks 
(GAO, AIMD-98-22, 1999) 
In addition, three studies depict the realities of Internet security incidents 
concerning the DOD, the AF, and the general population. These studies were the 
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Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment 
Program, the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) Computer Security 
Assistance Program (CSAP), and the Howard study, An Analysis of Security Incidents 
on the Internet 1989 - 1995. 
GAP AIMD-96-84 Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of 
Defense Pose Increasing Risk, published in 1996 and submitted to the US Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, reports on "the extent to which Defense computer 
systems are being attacked, the actual and potential damage to its information and 
systems, and the challenges Defense is facing in securing sensitive information" (GAO, 
AIMD-96-84,1996:1). The report based its facts on DISA's Vulnerability Analysis and 
Assessment Program, in which DISA personnel penetrated DOD computer systems via 
the Internet, from 1992 through 1995. The report stated: 
• DISA conducted 38,000 total attacks 
• DISA successfully gained access to 24,700 target computers, or 65 
percent 
• Total number of successful attacks detected, 988 or 4 percent 
• Total number of detected attacks reported, 267 or 27 percent 
• About 1 in 150 successful attacks drew an active defensive response 
from the organizations being tested (GAO, AIMD-96-84,1996:19) 
















































(GAO, AIMD-96-84, 1996:20) 
Figure 12 - Results of DISA Vulnerability Assessments, 1992 -1995 
With respect to the AFIWC CSAP study, Howard stated that the AFIWC study 
was: 
[...] a different study during 1995, the "security posture" of selected systems 
at 15 Air Force bases was evaluated by the Air Force Information Warfare 
Center (AFIWC), as part of their Computer Security Assistance Program 
(CSAP) [...]. Of the 1,248 hosts attacked, 673 (54%) did not allow access. 
Access was gained at the root level on 291 hosts (23%), and to the account 
level on 284 hosts (23%). Of the 1,248 attacks, 156 were reported (13%), 
which means that around 1 out of every 8 attacks resulted in a report. 
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:175) 
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Figure 13 - AFIWC 1995 CSAP Results 
Finally, Howard "analyzed trends in Internet security through an investigation of 
4,299 security-related incidents on the Internet reported to the Computer Emergency 
Response Team Coordination Center (CERT®/CC) from 1989 to 1995" (CERT®/CC, 
Analysis, 2001). The CERT®/CC is: 
Located at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a federally funded 
research and development center at Carnegie Mellon University in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Following the Internet Worm incident, which 
brought 10 percent of Internet systems to a halt in November 1988, the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) charged the SEI 
with setting up a center to coordinate communication among experts 
during security emergencies and to help prevent future incidents. Since 
then, the CERT®/CC has helped to establish other response teams and 
our incident handling practices have been adopted by more than 85 
response teams around the world. (CERT®/CC, Meet, 2000) 
Upon completion of his analysis, Howard found the following with respect to Internet 
security activity: 
A total of 4,567 incidents over this 7 year period were 
reconstructed from the CERT®/CC records. This included 268 false 
alarms (5.9%), and 4,299 actual incidents (94.1%). Most of the 
CERT®/CC incidents (89.3%) were unauthorized access incidents, which 
were further classified into their degree of success in obtaining access: 
root break-in (27.7%), account break-in (24.1%), and access attempts 
(37.6%). Relative to the growth in Internet hosts, each of these access 
categories was found to be decreasing over the period of this research: 
root-level break-ins at a rate around 19% less than the increase in 
32 
Internet hosts, account-level break-ins at a rate around 11% less, and 
access attempts at a rate around 17% less. 
Of the 4,299 actual incidents reported to the CERT®/CC, 458 
(10.7%) were classified as unauthorized use incidents. These were 
further classified into denial-of-service attacks (2.4%), corruption of 
information incidents (3.1%), and disclosure of information incidents 
(5.1%). The growth in total unauthorized use incidents was around 9% 
per year greater than the growth in Internet hosts. (Howard, Analysis, 
1997:235) 
These studies provide a snapshot of the Internet security activity, from the DOD, 
Air Force, and public's perspective, from 1989 through 1995. Still, as illustrated by the 
following examples, analyzing and subsequently classifying this activity continues to be 
a problem. When questioned about yearly reports of hacker attacks against the DOD, 
several key DOD and government subject matter experts provided the following 
responses: 
• Air Force Maj. General John Campbell, commander of the Joint Task 
force for Computer Network Defense said the number of attacks was 
approximately 250,000, with unauthorized intrusions equaling 22,144 in 
1999. (Verton, 2000:10) 
• Lt. General David Kelley, director of the Defense Information Systems 
Agency said unauthorized intrusions increased about 300 percent, 5,844 
in 1998 to 18,433 in 1999. (Ibid.:10) 
• Lt. Col. LeRoy Lungren, program manager for the Army's National 
Security Improvement Program, said the Army had 285,000 network 
queries in 2000. (Ibid.:10) 
• The Department of Justice said the number of government hacking cases 
increased from 547 in 1998 to 1,154 in 2000. (Ibid.: 10) 
Not only were the figures stating the magnitude of the problem different, but also with 
respect to this study, these subject matter experts used different words to describe the 
problem. This is not solely their fault. 
By looking at the Air Force's Internet security information collection process, one 
can see that the process itself adds to the ambiguity. Appendix E and Appendix F 
contains examples of the forms the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team 
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(AFCERT) uses to gather Internet security incident from the Air Force community. 
AFCERT provides "information protect (IP) assistance to Air Force units" (AFCERT, 
2000). These forms allow Air Force personnel to report Internet security activity 
information to the AFCERT. AFCERT's peers, the Army CERT (ACERT), the CERT 
Coordination Center (CERT®/CC), the DOD CERT, the Federal Computer Incident 
Response Center (FeDCIRC), and the Navy Computer Incident Response Team 
(NAVCIRT) use similar forms to collect Internet security activity information. Appendix G 
through Appendix L contains examples of their forms. 
Table 3 provides further examples detailing the problem of classify Internet 
security attacks and incidents. Table 3 lists keywords from various sources 
encompassing communication, computer, network, and Internet security used to 
describe Internet security attacks and incidents. 
Table 3 - Internet Security Attacks and Incidents Keyword List 
Howard's 1997 Study 2000 Information Survey AFDIR 33-303 AFSSI 5021 
•    Access attempts •    Attacks on bugs in Web servers •    Compromise •    Administrative 
•    Account break-in (e.g., CGI script-related attacks) •    Computer Crime Vulnerability 
•    Corruption of •    Attacks related to insecure •    Computer •    Breach 
information passwords Security Incident •    Incident 
incidents •    Attacks related to protocol •    Impersonation (a •    Intruder 
•    Denial-of-service weaknesses form of spoofing) •    Malicious Logic 
•    Disclosure of •    Buffer overflows •    Malicious •    Penetration 
information •    Denial-of-Service LogicA/irus/Worm •    Technical 
incidents •    Exploits related to active program •    Vulnerability Vulnerability 
•    Root break-in scripting/mobile code (ActiveX, 
Java, JavaScript, VBS 
•    Viruses/Trojans/Worms 
(Department of the Air (Department of the Air 
(Howard, Analysis, Force, AFDIR 33-303, Force, AFSSI 5021, 
1997:93) (Briney, 2000:40) 1999) 1996:8) 
The keyword list contains similar terms used to describe Internet security incidents, 
however a one-to-one correlation does not exist. In fact, the 2000 Information Survey 
even uses two types of subcategories, insider and outsider. Thus, the confusing 
answers given by the DOD and government subject matter experts appear to be 
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understandable. Consequently, the need to develop a coherent, consistent method to 
classify Internet security attacks and incidents exists. 
The Research Questions 
This thesis examines the computer and network attack taxonomies developed by 
Howard. Howard developed the taxonomies to help him classify Internet security 
incidents as part of his doctoral research and to develop a common language for 
computer security as part of a follow-on study. A resulting recommendation included 
continued evaluation of the computer and network attack taxonomy to make practical 
modifications. According to Howard, "the taxonomy developed for this research was 
found to be satisfactory" (Howard, Analysis, 1997:235). When interviewed about the 
review process of the taxonomy, Howard replied, "my dissertation taxonomy was only 
reviewed by the committee, although Tom Longstaff was both on my committee and one 
of the CERT managers" (Howard, Interview, 2000). Therefore, one research question 
for this study is, "Are Howard's 1997 and 1998 computer and network attack taxonomies 
still satisfactory?". 
A second research question is, "How do the taxonomies compare to the 
information being collected about computer and network attacks?". Several civilian, 
government and military organizations collect information concerning computer and 
network attacks. If the taxonomies are satisfactory, making sure these organizations 
collect the appropriate information to use with them would help the taxonomies become 
accepted, and eventually used. 
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Methodology 
I may not have gone where I intended to go, but I think I have ended up 
where I intended to be. Douglas Adams (qtd. in Quoteland.com, 2000) 
Research Design 
The study uses a qualitative research method to conduct this study, using two 
techniques: a questionnaire and content analysis. According to Dooley, qualitative 
research refers to "social research based on field observations analyzed without 
statistics" (Dooley, 1995:259). He succinctly described the analysis this researcher 
plans to perform: 
The analysis of qualitative data begins with the first observation. As 
the observation phase winds down, analysis becomes more intense. 
Analysis organizes the hundreds of pages of raw notes into a meaningful 
pattern. It interconnects discrete observations and locates these 
connected events within a small number of conceptual categories. As 
with a jigsaw puzzle, the researcher fits and refits the pieces according to 
a variety of tentative models until few unconnected pieces remain and the 
fit seems subjectively and logically satisfying. 
A final report gives the resulting "jigsaw" picture as clearly and 
convincingly as possible. A common reporting method combines 
quotations from interview with anecdotes from the field observations to 
illustrate and support the analyst's general arguments. In support of a 
casual model, the analyst may report the approximate frequency and 
distribution of the different categories of observations (for example, high 
versus low proselytizing) as evidence. Such event counts may even 
support basic statistical analysis, but the qualitative researcher seldom 
relies as heavily on statistics as does the quantitative researcher. 
(Dooley, 1995:271) 
Based on the results of this process, this researcher will make inferences relative to the 
research question. 
Methodology 
Since this study includes both of Howard's taxonomies, the following 
methodology applies to both. Round 1 involves the 1997 computer and network attack 
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taxonomy and Round 2 involves the 1998 computer and network attack taxonomy. First, 
the researcher plans to analyze the computer and network attack taxonomy by using a 
questionnaire with Likert-style scaling. Likert-style scaling "consists of a statement 
followed by a number of possible levels of agreement (for example, from 'strongly agree' 
to 'strongly disagree')" (Dooley, 1995:103). This researcher selected a 4-point scale to 
compel the respondents to make a discrete decision about the taxonomy, thereby 
reducing the possibility of the researcher misinterpreting the respondents' level of 
agreement with the questions. The questions came from Howard's definition and 
characterization of a satisfactory taxonomy. Thus, the respondents will base their 
professional judgments using the same criteria as Howard. 
This researcher plans to use a nonprobability sampling method to select 
respondents to complete the questionnaire. Nonprobability sampling is "any method in 
which the elements have unequal chances of being selected" (Dooley, 1995:135). As a 
result, this researcher will use a purposive sampling procedure to select the elements, 
which are the respondents. In purposive sampling, the researcher "chooses 
respondents because of certain characteristics" (Ibid.:136). This researcher will select 
respondents based upon characteristics related to their background and knowledge, not 
their job category or job description. This differentiation is necessary because 
information security functions and responsibilities span several disciplines, as illustrated 
in the Information Magazine 2000 Information Security Survey in Table 4. In addition, 
these security professionals allocate various portions of their job responsibilities to their 
job of information security as illustrated in Table 4. 
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Table 4 - Job Category 
Job Category Percentage 










Table 5 - Portion of Job Responsibilities Devoted to Infosecurity 
Portion of job responsibilites 






The significance of this information is that "a Forrester Research survey conducted this 
past May found that only about half of managers participate in risk management 
activities. To a certain extent, that suggests that security is riding the coattails of 
business initiatives that involve security, but aren't necessarily security-driven" (Briney, 
2000:44). 
Therefore, knowledge, not job category or job position is more important for this 
analysis, thus the purposive sampling technique. With that in mind, the characteristics 
used to select the respondents for this study were Air Force military member, Air Force 
civilian professional, or civilian professional with a background in the following 
disciplines: computer security, information security, communication security, information 
assurance, Internet security, and information warfare. 
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Although the respondents represent a larger population, this researcher will not 
use their responses or generate statistics intended to generalize to the larger population. 
Their responses, based upon their professional opinions, will only be used to analyze if 
the taxonomies are still satisfactory within the constraints of this study. In addition, the 
questionnaire represents categorical data, not numerical data. Consequently, they 
represent "arbitrarily selected numerical codes for the categories and have no utility 
beyond that" (McClave, Benson, and Sincich, 1998:14). However, the data can be 
ranked and meaningfully ordered, which this researcher plans to do. This data will be 
used to infer the level of agreement the respondents have with Howard's description of 
satisfactory. 
Next, this researcher will perform a content analysis of the comments submitted 
by the respondents and the business forms used by Internet security activity 
organizations. Content analysis "is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their content" (Krippendorff, 1980:21). This researcher will use 
the analytical semantics textual analysis approach. According to Rosengren, "it is 
possible to make reasonable interpretations of a text. The reasonableness is dependent 
on certain contextual claims, which can be linguistical, logical, semantical, or empirical" 
(Rosengren, 1981:29). 
With respect to the questionnaire, this researcher will use the comments 
submitted by the respondents for any Disagree or Strongly Disagree selection, as well 
as the comments submitted for question 7. Question 7 explicitly solicits inputs for areas 
of improvement for the taxonomy. Both sets of comments use an open-ended question 
format. Open-ended questions are, "questions in interviews and on questionnaires that 
have no pre-specified answers" (Hoffer, George, and Valacich, 1998:244). In addition, 
each respondent is encouraged to "talk about whatever interests him or her in within the 
39 
general bounds of the question" (lbid.:244).   Upon completion of the content analysis of 
the respondents' comments, the researcher will analyze the business forms used by 
Internet security organizations to collect information on Internet security activity. 
According to Hoffer, George, and Valacich, "[.••] a document useful to systems 
analysts is a business form [...]" (1998:255) because "forms are important for 
understanding a system because they explicitly indicate what data flow in or out of a 
system [...]" (Ibid.:257). Consequently, this researcher will analyze the business forms 
used by various Internet security activity organizations, to determine if these 
organizations collect appropriate information which will help Internet security 
professional adequately use the computer and network taxonomy to classify Internet 
attacks and incidents. These organizations are: 
a. Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) 
b. Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) 
c. Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT®/CC) 
d. DOD Computer Emergency Response Team (DOD CERT) 
e. Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FeDCIRC) 
f. Navy Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT), this includes the 
Marine Corps 
Similar to the rationale for selecting the questionnaire respondents, the researcher 
selected these organizations because they represent a collective community of similar 
interest. This researcher also included the CERT®/CC because it was Howard's data 
source for his study and because it is the de facto Internet security community leader, as 
stated in the 1988 DARPA press release: 
In providing direct service to the Internet community, the CERT will 
focus on the special needs of the research community and serve as a 
prototype for similar operations in other computer communities [...]. 
It will also serve as a focal point for the research community for 
identification and repair of security vulnerabilities, informal assessment of 
existing systems in the research community, improvement to emergency 
response capability, and user security awareness. (CERT®/CC, DARPA, 
2001) 
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This researcher will develop a process-to-data entity matrix, illustrated in Table 6 and 
Table 7 as output from this analysis. A process-to-data entity matrix "identifies which 
data are captured, used, updated, or deleted within a process" (Hoffer, George, and 
Valacich, 1998:174). This process-to-data entity matrix will provide a more detailed view 
of the correlation between the information collected by these Internet security 
organizations and the computer and network attack taxonomies. 
Table 6 - Business Form vs. 1997 Taxonomy Categories Matrix Example 







Table 7 - Business Form vs. 1998 Taxonomy Categories Matrix Example 










IV. Results and Analysis 
There is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods; 
and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever it may be." 
Charles Sanders Pierce (qtd. in Quoteland.com, 2000) 
Round 1 -1997 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire 
This researcher developed a questionnaire, contained in Appendix A, to analyze 
the level of agreement that the respondents had that the computer and network attack 
taxonomy was satisfactory. The questionnaire provided a mechanism to gather 
information concerning the taxonomy in a consistent manner, from all respondents. This 
researcher calculated composite scores for each question by summing up the scores of 
each item, in this case the level of agreement selected, for each question (Dooley, 1995, 
103). Each question carried the same weight, meaning each question was considered 
just as important as the other, for the purposes of this study. In addition, Howard stated 
that his committee, which consisted of four members, reviewed his taxonomy and found 
it to be satisfactory. This researcher released 18 questionnaires and received 10 back, 
resulting in a 56% response rate. The number of returned questionnaires, each 
representing a single respondent, surpassed the total number of reviewers for Howard's 
original study; this was a goal of this process. 
Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that the 1997 computer and 
network attack taxonomy was satisfactory. The modal level of agreement for questions 
1 - 6, which is also the item receiving the highest composite score for each question, 
was Agree. Underscoring this modal level of agreement by the respondents was the fact 
that one hundred percent of the respondents selected Agree for question 6, the only 
question to receive a unanimous opinion. Question 6 explicitly asks the respondents 
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about their level of agreement with the statement that the taxonomy is useful. No 
respondent selected either extreme level, Strongly Agree or Strongly Disagree. Table 8 
lists the composite scores for questions 1 - 6 of the questionnaire. 







1.   The computer and network attack 
taxonomy meets the described 
characteristics of MUTUALLY 
EXCLUSIVE. 
0 6 4 0 
2.   The computer and network attack 
taxonomy meets the described 
characteristics of EXHAUSTIVE. 
0 6 4 0 
3.   The computer and network attack 
taxonomy meets the described 
characteristics of UNAMBIGUOUS. 
0 6 4 0 
4.   The computer and network attack 
taxonomy meets the described 
characteristics of REPEATABLE. 
0 6 3 0 
5.   The computer and network attack 
taxonomy meets the described 
characteristics of ACCEPTED. 
0 8 1 0 
6.   The computer and network attack 
taxonomy meets the described 
characteristics of USEFUL. 
0 10 0 0 
Although the modal level of agreement for questions 1 - 6 was Agree, those 
respondents that selected Disagree provided valuable information concerning the 
taxonomy. The following paragraphs summarize their comments. Appendix B, Table 12 
contains all the respondents' comments, verbatim. 
Question 1 inquired about mutual exhaustiveness. The respondents felt that 
although Howard defined discrete categories, the respondents provided several 
examples of the existence of overlap between categories. The statement about a 
hacker can wear two hats, one as a terrorist working for an enemy nation and one as a 
vandal causing frivolous damage, was a clear example. They also pointed out that 
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overlap can, and mostly likely does, exist between every category. One interesting 
observation is that the respondents focused primarily on the Attacker category. 
Question 2 inquired about exhaustiveness. Since several respondents were Air 
Force members, this question resulted in a few military specific comments. Internet 
incidents for military purposes did not appear to be included in the taxonomy, according 
to some respondents, although one can speculate that a terrorist working for a 
nation/state under military control would qualify as a military operation classification. 
Additionally, Howard's list of tools does not include energy pulses or the tried and true 
social engineering. As such, the respondents do offer clear examples that the taxonomy 
may not be as exhaustive as it seemed initially. 
Question 3 inquired about unambiguousness. These comments appear to be 
closely related to the mutual exclusivity comments. If issues exist with mutual 
exclusivity, then it is not surprising that issues also exist with unambiguousness. As 
stated, the objective of an incident may be to obtain some type of monetary payoff, 
however that payoff action may have resulted from the theft of valuable information. 
Therefore, how would one classify this event? As illustrated earlier in the use of various 
terms to describe Internet security incidents, clearly and concisely defining these actions 
continues to be a problem. 
Question 4 inquired about repeatability. The comments provided appear to 
question the repeatability characteristic of the taxonomy. First, if issues exist with 
mutual exclusivity and unambiguousness, then how can one repeat the classification 
process the same way, if one is confused about which category to use? Second, based 
on the issues stated, how can the taxonomy appear logical if issues exist? The answer 
may be in logic itself. If one uses logic, or more appropriately, common sense 
reasoning, then it is likely that the process of classifying incidents could be repeated. 
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However, this appears to defy the purpose of a taxonomy. By definition, a taxonomy is a 
"division into ordered groups or categories" ("Taxonomy"). Therefore, one would simply 
classify, or place, an incident in the appropriate group or category, with little to no 
reasoning required. It is worth noting that in Howard's discussion on developing the 
computer and network attack taxonomy, repeatability appeared to be a problem with 
several of the taxonomies discussed. 
Question 5 inquired about acceptability. Although one respondent disagreed with 
this question, the disagreement appears to be with the term Accepted. Howard defined 
accepted as, "logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved" 
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:53). Since the modal level of agreement for this question was 
Agree, it appears the majority of respondents understood the taxonomy and believed it 
was logical and intuitive. 
Question 6 inquired about usefulness. As stated earlier, this was the only 
question that all the respondents came to the same conclusion, by selecting Agree. 
Even with the questions about the other classification categories, all the respondents, to 
include those who disagreed about other areas, selected Agree. Unfortunately, no 
additional comments were provided, so this researcher would have to speculate about 
this result. Notwithstanding the lack of comments, the cliche, a picture is worth a 
thousand words, could justly apply. As noted in this study, and others, identification, 
classification, and even annotation of Internet security incidents are a problem. As 
Howard noted: 
The Internet is a scary place. At least that's what we've been told by 
numerous authors - scholars and sensationalists alike [...]. Prior to this 
research, our knowledge of security problems on the Internet was 
incomplete and primarily anecdotal. Despite our increasing reliance on 
the computer networks, there had been no systematic and coordinated 
program for gathering and distributing information about Internet security 
incidents. (Howard, Analysis, 1997: 1) 
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As such, the fact that the computer and network attack taxonomy may be one of the first 
graphical descriptions of the intruder process viewed by the respondents, the taxonomy 
itself could be the reason behind the unanimous selection of Agree for question 6. 
Finally, question 7 was an unadulterated solicitation for suggestions for areas of 
improvement to the taxonomy. This solicitation in no means suggests that Howard's 
work is flawed. In contrast, it is recognition of the process that Howard developed. 
According to Hammer and Champy, a process is "a collection of activities that takes one 
or more kinds of inputs and creates an output that is of value to a customer" (Hammer 
and Champy, 1993:35). In this case, Howard created a process to assist the Internet 
security professionals by taking their inputs, a security anomaly, and turning it into 
something useful, a classified attack or incident. In fact, the taxonomy is a process itself, 
starting with the attacker's perspective and ending with the attacker's objectives 
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:71). Therefore, change should be considered a normal part of 
the life of any process, not an indication of a flaw. 
The respondents provided numerous recommendations on areas of improvement 
to the taxonomy, which are listed in Appendix B, Table 13. Several trends and ideas 
resulted from the information provided by the respondents. It is interesting to note that 
many of the suggestions appear as items lacking in the taxonomy, in actuality they 
reflect two issues underlying this study: lack of a common language and lack of a 
structured method to classify Internet security incidents. As noted by Howard and 
Longstaff, "much of the computer security information regularly gathered and 
disseminated by individuals and organizations cannot currently be combined or 
compared because a 'common language' has yet to emerge in the field of computer 
security" (Howard and Longstaff, 1998:iii). As such, what may appear as something 
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missing may in fact exist, however it is referenced differently. In addition, since a 
structured process does not appear to exist, it is possible that the respondents' 
interpretation of the taxonomy process differs. 
Howard also noted that, "it should be expected, however, for a satisfactory 
taxonomy to be limited in some of these characteristics. A taxonomy is an 
approximation of reality that is used to gain greater understanding in a field of study. 
Because it is an approximation, it will fall short in some characteristics" (Howard, 
Analysis, 1997:53). Notwithstanding these issues, several threads appeared after 
analyzing the suggestions from the respondents. 
In general, as indicated by several comments from the respondents, questions 
exist about the completeness of the classification categories, mutually exclusive, 
exhaustive, unambiguousness, repeatable, accepted, and useful. Howard published the 
taxonomy in 1997, however as stated in this study, the Internet and peripheral industries 
have experienced tremendous growth and change since then. As such, it makes sense 
that the taxonomy may not reflect the current language used today, with respect to 
Internet security activity. 
Concerning the Attacker category, the taxonomy does list several types of 
Attackers, but some respondents felt it needs to differentiate between insider and 
outsider. An insider refers to "full- or part-time employees, contracted workers, 
consultants, company partners or suppliers" (Briney, 2000:48) and outsider refers to 
"everyone not included in the description for 'insider'" (lbid.:49). This differentiation 
could apply to all the Attacker types included in the taxonomy. In addition, several 
comments had a military slant to them, such as information warfare and the observe, 
orient, decide, and act (OODA) Loop. As noted, several respondents were Air Force 
officers, who obviously have a military view to many things. 
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Several key issues resulted from the comments on the Tools category. First, the 
Tools category implies, or leads one to interpret, that each tool listed refers to a single 
process. To clarify, a respondent annotated that Attackers most likely use one or more 
tools to accomplish their goal, and the taxonomy requires the user to chose a specific 
tool. This leads into the second key issue, interpretation of the taxonomy. Again, one 
respondent noted that one may interpret that all the blocks on the taxonomy line up 
horizontally, therefore, hackers goes to user commands which goes to implementation 
vulnerability, etc. As stated earlier, interpretation of the taxonomy itself many lead one 
to assume it is lacking in certain areas. Finally, some respondents felt the Tools 
category focused solely on the technical aspects of Internet security activity. Based on 
one's interpretation of Tools, this category does not include Social Engineering, stealing 
of passwords, and simple human error as tools towards obtaining the objective. 
The Access category appears to contain three distinct groupings of information. 
It was the only category that a respondent clearly stated that the meaning of this 
category was unclear. However, similar to the Tools comments, issues such as Social 
Engineering, stealing of passwords, and simple human error appear to be missing. 
Although, one can argue that problems with implementation, design, configuration, and 
access control can result from human error. 
The Results category comments followed the same trend as the other categories. 
Even though Howard wanted to avoid simply listing items, lists to occur within each 
category. As such, lists tend to leave one opened to the question, "Why didn't you 
include this one?" The respondents offered several other types of Results, to include 
financial loss, customer goodwill loss, posturing for future actions, and permanent 
destruction of information. An interesting comment concerned the issue that the 
taxonomy appears to focus on short-term, not long-term results. The respondent 
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suggested that an Attacker's objective might take a long time to achieve. This end to the 
means may result in several of the categories listed by Howard, in both the short-term 
and the long-term, as the Attacker works towards the end objective; this is a very 
interesting concept. Consequently, the respondent appears to believe that the taxonomy 
misses this concept, and implies that a Result is the end of the Attacker's work, which 
immediately leads to an Objective. 
Finally, the Objectives category comments also resemble those previously 
stated. The listing itself causes one to question why something was not included. The 
respondents suggested items such as distinguishing between personal and corporate 
gains and including the military perspective. However, one can argue that the 
entertainment and education objectives are not missing, but are included within the 
challenge and status list. 
Even with all the suggested areas of improvement, the most important 
information obtained from the questionnaire was that the respondents agreed that the 
taxonomy was satisfactory. The fact that the modal level of agreement for questions 1 - 
6 was Agree and that all the respondents selected Agree for the question that explicitly 
asked them do they agree with the statement that the taxonomy meets the 
characteristics described as useful, supports this claim. 
Round 1 - Internet Security Information Collected verses the 1997 Taxonomy 
This researcher found that although many organizations collect information on 
Internet security activity, they do not freely release this information. Due to national 
security concerns by the DOD and liability concerns of the private sector, these 
organizations maintain strict security and confidentiality policies to protect the 
information. Consequently, how can one operationally test the computer and network 
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taxonomy? The method used by this researcher involved content analysis of the 
business forms used by these organizations to collection Internet security activity 
information. By analyzing these business forms, one can determine if the information 
being collected is appropriate to use as inputs into the computer and network attack 
taxonomy. In other words, are these organizations collecting the appropriate 
information, which will help Internet security professionals adequately use the computer 
and network taxonomy to classify Internet attacks and incidents? 
This researcher collected and analyzed the business forms used by the following 
Internet security organizations: 
a. Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) 
b. Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) 
c. Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT®/CC) 
d. DOD Computer Emergency Response Team (DOD CERT) 
e. Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FeDCIRC) 
f. Navy Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT), this includes the 
Marine Corps 
These business forms, located in Appendix E through Appendix L, detail the information 
collected by these organizations to record Internet security activity. Table 9 illustrates 
the relationship between the Internet security organizations' business forms and the 
1997 taxonomy. A "Y indicates that the organization explicitly requests information 
relative to that specific category. An "N" indicates that the organization does not 
explicitly request information relative to that specific category. 
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Table 9 - Business Form vs. 1997 Taxonomy Matrix 
ATTACKERS TOOLS ACCESS RESULTS OBJECTIVES 
ACERT N Y Y Y N 
AFCERT N Y Y Y N 
CERTO/CC N Y Y Y N 
DOD CERT N Y Y Y Y 
FeDCIRC N Y Y Y N 
NAVCIRT N Y Y Y N 
As illustrated above, all the organizations explicitly request information relative to 
the Attackers, Tools, Access, and Results categories. The organizations have data 
entry fields either specifically labeled using the same words as the taxonomy category or 
very similar words. For example, the NAVCIRT form contains the data entry item, "9. 
Damage or effects resulting from attack" (Department of the Navy, 1998). The only 
organization that appears to explicitly request information about the Objectives was the 
DOD CERT, otherwise none of the business forms contained any explicit reference to 
Attackers or Objectives. In fact, this researcher only assumes that it is possible that 
some victims include this type of information via the catchall data entry field, usually 
labeled Describe the Incident. 
Additional information gleaned from analyzing the business forms included the 
finding that no standard form existed. Although the organizations use similar data entry 
fields, a single form did not exist. A standard form would help the reporting process and 
the information sharing process. Next, all the organizations provide the catch all data 
entry field, Describe the Incident. The necessity of this data entry is obvious, however 
the information entered is usually written from the victim's perspective, which most likely 
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is different for each victim. The most interesting thing concerning this data entry field, is 
the fact that the CERT®/CC appears to depend solely on this data entry field as its 
source of information. The CERT®/CC's business form was the weakest, or less 
specific, of all. This is surprising because it is assumed the CERT®/CC, which is the de 
facto leader of the CERTs, collects the most detailed information of all. Finally, the 
ACERT and AFCERT use two forms to collect their information; one form to report 
intrusions or incidents, and one form to report malicious code. Although both are distinct 
events, the need for two forms is unclear, especially since the NAVCIRT explicitly 
collects both types of information on one form. 
Although the Internet security activity monitoring organizations explicitly collect 
information that can be used as input into the computer and network attack taxonomy, 
they do not explicitly collect all the necessary information. As a result, there maybe a 
disconnect between the information collected and the information needed by the 
taxonomy. 
Round 2 -1998 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire 
This researcher developed a questionnaire, contained in Appendix C, to analyze 
the level of agreement that the respondents had with the 1998 computer and network 
attack taxonomy was satisfactory. The researcher followed the same methodology used 
for the 1997 taxonomy questionnaire. This researcher released 10 questionnaires to the 
respondents that replied to the 1997 questionnaire, and received 7 back, resulting in a 
70% response rate. 
Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that the 1998 computer and 
network attack taxonomy was satisfactory. The modal level of agreement for questions 
1, 3, 4, 5, and was Agree, and the modal level of agreement for question 2 was Strongly 
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Agree and Agree. In fact, each question received at least one Strongly Agree selection. 
No respondent selected the other extreme level of agreement, Strongly Disagree. Table 
10 lists the composite scores for questions 1 - 6 of the questionnaire. 







1.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. 
1 4 2 0 
2.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
EXHAUSTIVE. 
3 3 1 0 
3.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
2 4 1 0 
4.  The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
REPEATABLE. 
2 4 1 0 
5.  The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
ACCEPTED. 
2 5 0 0 
6.  The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
USEFUL. 
3 4 0 0 
Although the modal level of agreement for questions 1 - 6 was Agree, or 
Strongly Agree and Agree for question 2, those respondents that selected Disagree 
provided valuable information concerning the 1998 computer and network attack 
taxonomy. The following paragraphs summarize their comments. Appendix D, Table 14 
contains all the respondents' comments, verbatim. 
Question 1 inquired about mutual exclusiveness. A respondent believed that 
there needed to be a distinction between internal and external user attack, because the 
respondent believes internal users cause more damage. However, upon closer 
examination, the respondent may be referring to accidental damage caused by internal 
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users; this was not clear. In addition, another respondent reiterated the common theme 
that the category may not be mutually exclusive, or in other words, as complete as 
possible. Again, lists of items almost inevitably leave something out. 
The remaining questions, which inquired about exhaustiveness, 
unambiguousness, repeatability, acceptability, and usefulness, resulted in two total 
comments. The comments simply question the completeness of the categories and the 
interpretation of the taxonomy. Once again, claiming that a category contains everything 
appears to challenge one to find the missing piece. In addition, individual interpretation 
of the taxonomy may lead to problems with ambiguousness and repeatability. The 
respondents submitted no comments about acceptability and usefulness. 
The respondents provided several recommendations on areas of improvement to 
the 1998 computer and network attack taxonomy, which are listed in Appendix D Table 
15. Two trends appeared after analyzing the comments. First, the respondents 
appeared to approve of the 1998 version of the taxonomy over the 1997. Their 
comments include words such as much better, good, and no changes. Second, 
questions over the completeness and interpretation of the taxonomy were apparent. To 
reiterate, Howard published this taxonomy in 1998, which was static, compared to the 
Internet, computers, and networks, which are dynamic. 
Concerning the Attacker category, the respondents believed Howard's construct 
was not only better than his 1997 taxonomy, but it appeared to represent Attackers in a 
more acceptable way. The respondents appeared very pleased with the description of 
this category. However, they did offer more suggestions on the continued stratification 
of the category, such as distinguishing between hackers and crackers. Finally, a 
comment that applies to the taxonomy in general is that one's interpretation of the 
taxonomy may affect what is determined as missing or not missing. 
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The comments about Tools appeared to be more questions about Howard's 
definition of Tools, than anything else. Working in such a dynamic profession, many 
accepted definitions, words, and phrases change frequently. However, by the nature of 
the comments, they may implicitly justify the necessity of the computer and network 
attack taxonomy to ensure everyone speaks the same language. Also, a respondent 
provided an excellent example about why the questions exist about completeness of the 
taxonomy, specifically mutual exclusiveness and unambiguousness. Toolkits, a tool, 
consists of tools. How should these be classified? Therefore, one respondent believed 
an obvious overlap exists with Toolkits and the tool types listed in the taxonomy. 
Vulnerability received an interesting comment about the focus of the taxonomy. 
Although Howard designed that the taxonomy from the attacker's perspective, a 
respondent felt it focused more on the technological side of the issue. The respondent 
clearly emphasized that the human element plays a role. The best security technology 
cannot account for all human mistakes. Therefore, the respondent may be implying that 
this category, and probably others, needs to reflect more of the human element within 
this process. 
The next categories, Action, Target, Unauthorized Result, and Objectives 
received few comments. The comments provided simply acknowledged the 
respondents' belief that the categories appropriately captured the content, or reiterated 
questions about the taxonomy's completeness. The respondents appeared to 
understand the meaning of Action, Target, Unauthorized Result, and Objectives. Those 
who did not stated that one's interpretation of the taxonomy might result in different 
meanings. 
The respondents appeared to have a high level of agreement with Howard's 
1998 computer and network attack taxonomy. Not only did some respondents select 
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Agree, some also selected Strongly Agree as their selection for a question. In fact, 
question 2, which inquired about exhaustiveness, resulted in Strongly Agree and Agree 
receiving the same composite score. In addition, the comments included questions 
about the taxonomy's completeness and suggested further levels of details, however the 
comments also included accolades toward the 1998 taxonomy. 
Round 2 - Internet Security Information Collected verses the 1998 Taxonomy 
The organizations that collect Internet security activity information explicitly 
collect some, but not all information necessary for inputs into the taxonomy. Table 11 
illustrates the relationship between the Internet security organizations' business forms 
and the 1998 computer and network attack taxonomy. A "Y indicates that the 
organization explicitly requests information relative to that specific category. An "N" 
indicates that the organization does not explicitly request information relative to that 
specific category. 
Table 11 - Business Form vs. 1998 Taxonomy Matrix 
ATTACKERS TOOLS VULNERABILITY ACTION TARGET 
UNAUTHORIZED 
RESULT OBJECTIVES 
ACERT N Y N Y Y Y N 
AFCERT N Y N Y Y Y N 
CERT®/CC N Y N Y N Y N 
DOD CERT N Y N Y Y Y Y 
FeDCIRC N Y N Y Y Y N 
NAVCIRT N Y Y Y Y Y N 
This process-to-data entity matrix also indicates that as the level of detail gets 
finer, it appears the Internet security organizations need to ask more direct questions to 
obtain the necessary information to use the 1998 taxonomy. The business forms used 
by the Internet security organizations appear to request less detailed information than 
what the 1998 taxonomy requires. As stated earlier, the de facto CERT leader 
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CERT®/CC appears to collect less detailed information than all the other CERTs. 
Regardless, these organizations do collect some information useful to the taxonomy and 
with some work and coordination with the taxonomy developers, they can most likely 
explicitly collect more. 
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V. Discussion and Conclusion 
When you make the finding yourself - even if you're the last person on Earth 
to see the light - you'll never forget it. Carl Sagan (qtd. in Quoteland.com, 
2000) 
Discussion 
Based on the results of the 1997 and 1998 computer and network attack 
taxonomy questionnaires, this researcher concludes that Howard's taxonomies are 
satisfactory. Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that the 1997 taxonomy 
was satisfactory because the modal level of agreement for questions 1 - 6 was Agree. 
Underscoring this fact was that one hundred percent of the respondents selected Agree 
for question 6, which explicitly asks the respondents about the statement that the 
taxonomy is useful. In addition, the majority of respondents agreed that the 1998 
taxonomy because the modal level of agreement for questions 1, 3,4, 5, and was 
Agree, and the modal level of agreement for question 2 was Strongly Agree and 
Agree. In fact, questions 1 - 6 all received at least one Strongly Agree selection. 
It appears that the respondents preferred the 1998 taxonomy over the 1997 
taxonomy. First, the 1998 taxonomy received 13 Strongly Agree selections, while the 
1997 taxonomy did not receive any. Second, the 1998 taxonomy received fewer areas 
of improvement comments than the 1997 taxonomy. Third, the 1998 taxonomy received 
several accolades on its contents, while the 1997 received none. It is important to note 
that the same group of respondents analyzed both taxonomies. 
Although the respondents agreed that the taxonomies as a whole were 
satisfactory, they did find areas of improvement with them. They offered evidence that 
questioned the completeness of the taxonomy. In addition, they also indicated that even 
though the taxonomy may have met the definitions of mutually exclusive, exhaustive, 
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unambiguous, repeatable, accepted, and useful, these categories may still need work to 
persuade others to fully agree with the statements. However, the transition from the 
1997 taxonomy to the 1998 taxonomy appeared to have addressed many of the 
respondents' concerns. The additional stratification of the taxonomy appears to have 
provided the level of detail that the respondents agreed with. 
With respect to the relationship of the Internet security organizations' information 
gathering process and the taxonomy, there appears to be a disconnect. These 
organizations do explicitly collect some, but not all, the information necessary as inputs 
into the taxonomies. The analysis of both taxonomies resulted in similar findings, except 
that the 1998 taxonomy required more detailed information. Since the computer and 
network attack taxonomy is relatively new, it is quite likely that these organizations either 
are not aware of the taxonomy, or if aware, have not accepted its use. Regardless, 
some of the necessary information is explicitly collected. 
Along that line, explicit requests for information on Attackers and Objectives 
appeared lacking. First, several of the organizations requested the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address as a method to identify the source of the attack. The IP address is actually part 
of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which is the suite of 
protocols used to send and receive information across the Internet. By definition, 
TCP/IP is: 
The most accurate name for the set of protocols known as the "Internet 
Protocol Suite." TCP and IP are two of the protocols in this suite. Because 
TCP and IP are the best known of the protocols, it has become common to 
use the term TCP/IP or IP/TCP to refer to the whole family. TCP (the 
"transmission control protocol") is responsible for breaking up the message 
into datagrams, reassembling them at the other end, resending anything that 
gets lost, and putting things back in the right order. IP (the "Internet Protocol") 
is responsible for routing individual datagrams. (Department of the Air Force, 
33-129, 1999:44) 
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On the surface, using the IP address to identify attackers seem reliable, however based 
on IP Spoofing, it is not. IP spoofing is: 
The use of software to change the address of a data packet to make it appear 
to come from another machine. Many network routers use these IP 
addresses to identify which machines have valid access rights to the network. 
Spoofing allows a hacker to "change his identity" and appear as a valid 
machine within the network. (Ibid.:43) 
Therefore, requesting the IP address alone does not provide enough information to 
adequately, and confidently identify the Attackers. 
Second, the lack of explicit requests for information relative to the attackers 
Objective appears to be more nebulous. As indicated in Table 9 and Table 11, the DOD 
CERT appears to be the only Internet security organization that explicitly requests 
information on the attackers' objective, via their Why field of their business form. It is 
unknown exactly what information goes into this field, however at least the DOD CERT 
asks the questions. 
The analysis of the information collection process did reveal some interesting 
information. First, the information collection process appeared disjointed between the 
organizations. For example, they do not use standard forms to collect the Internet 
security activity information. As such, each organization asks different questions, from 
different perspectives, using different data entry methods, although they appear to be 
looking for the same thing; information on Internet security attacks and incidents. 
According to Hoffer, George, and Valacich: 
The goal of a form and report design is usability. Usability means that users 
can use a form or report quickly, accurately, and with high satisfaction. To be 
usable, designs must be consistent, efficient, self-explanatory, well-formatted, 
and flexible. (1998:540) 
Obviously, the CERTs have business forms that allow them to collect information, 
however the inconsistencies noted indicate that a standard information collection 
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process does not exist. The lack of a standard data collection process appears to 
perpetuate the lack of a common language problem, by continuing to allow victims to 
report incidents in a somewhat haphazard fashion. 
Limitations and Constraints 
Although the respondents deemed the taxonomy satisfactory, it does have some 
limitations. First, it includes lists of items per category, which seems appropriate. 
However, as stated throughout this thesis, lists beg some to discover the missing piece, 
or at least what they perceive as the missing piece. Second, it appears to encapsulate 
the attacker's process well, however others do, as indicated by the respondents' 
comments, interpret the process differently. This may be a human characteristic, but it is 
important to note that not everyone interprets the process the same way. Finally, this 
study included observations and professional interpretations of the taxonomy. To further 
validate the model it needs to be operationally tested. Operational testing involves using 
actual incident reports to determine how effective the taxonomies in the classification of 
computer and network attacks and incidents. This testing will further validate the 
taxonomies and encourage its acceptance and use. 
Concerning the respondents of the questionnaire, some limitations existed too. 
As indicated in Table 4, the information security profession traverses many disciplines. 
Although on one hand it can mean the information security level of awareness is high, 
since so many disciplines are concerned about it, but on the other hand, when 
specifically looking for the information security points of contact, it can be difficult. This 
researcher had to interview some of the respondents before allowing them to participate 
in the analysis, because it was not clear if they had the appropriate background. In more 
than one occasion, the original contacts responded by saying they were not the 
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appropriate persons for the interview, and referred the researcher to another contact. 
However, the sample size used for this study was small. A larger sample size should be 
used with future studies, which should allow the researcher to generalize to the larger 
population. Along that line, a comprehensive, validated survey instrument should be 
used to better capture the intent of the respondents. 
Comprehensive information on Internet security incidents is lacking. According 
to Fred B. Schneider, Chair, Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness, and 
editor of Trust in Cyberspace, "insufficient data exist about Internet outages and how the 
Internet's mechanisms are able to deal with them" (Schneider, et al., 1999:47). 
Schneider's committee participated in a DARPA and NSA requested study, in 
conjunction with the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, the 
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, and the National 
Research Council. The DARPA and NSA tasked the committee to "examine, discuss, 
and report on interrelated issues associated with the research, development, and 
commercialization of technologies for trustworthy systems and to use its assessment to 
develop recommendations for research to enhance information systems trustworthiness" 
(Schneider, et al., 1999:viii). Among other findings, the committee found that "a few 
university computer science departments have several faculty members who emphasize 
computer security research, but many departments have none who do. In any event, the 
number of computer security researchers is small compared to the number in other 
specialties [...]" (Ibid.:235). In short, the body of knowledge with respect to Internet 
security incidents is probably incomplete. 
Of the available information, the lack of access to actual incident data was stifling 
to this researcher. For the purposes of this study, this researcher attempted to acquire 
Internet security information from the CERT®/CC, AFCERT, as well as the local 
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organizations. All denied access to their information due to security or confidentiality 
concerns. These concerns are valid, however if the Internet community, specifically 
researchers, cannot get access to this information, then how can the community learn to 
improve itself and its security methods? 
Similarly, the lack of a standard business form to collect Internet security attack 
and incident information also limited this study. The use of different keywords and data 
entry formats required this researcher to literally figure out what the organizations were 
requesting. The forms were not consistent, self-explanatory, or well-formatted. Some 
were text documents converted into web pages, some were elaborate forms, and some 
were lists of several items to include in a report. 
Implications for Researchers 
The study revealed that the computer and network attack taxonomy appears to 
be on the right track to help the Internet security community effectively classify computer 
and network attacks and incidents. Future study of the taxonomy will help it mature and 
possibly become an accepted part of computer and network security profession. 
In addition, this study also revealed that Howard's work towards developing a 
common language for computer security appears appropriate. As indicated, several of 
the computer emergency response teams do not use standard forms or standard 
language when requesting pertinent information. These organizations collect similar, but 
not totally the same type of information. Researchers should continue this path of 
examination to help the industry work towards a more coherent method of information 
collection and dissemination. 
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Implications for Practitioners 
This study revealed that not only does Internet security appear to be a problem, 
but so is the process of describing the level of Internet security activity. Throughout this 
study interpretation appeared. American Heritage defines interpretation as, "the act of 
interpreting; explanation of what is obscure; translation; version; construction; as, the 
interpretation of a foreign language, of a dream, or of an enigma" ("Interpretation"). It is 
disconcerting that with issues such as national security, intellectual property rights, and 
electronic commerce at risk via the Internet that the industry continues to have difficulty 
plainly describing the status of Internet security. Practitioners should work towards a 
common model and common language to help the industry better address and identify 
risks associated these issues. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Perhaps the most important recommendation is continued monitoring and 
examination of the computer and network taxonomy. This study revealed several areas 
of improvement of the taxonomy. These areas of improvement should be analyzed to 
determine their feasibility and to help validate the respondents' comments, as well as the 
second iteration of the computer and network taxonomy. 
In addition to continued examination of the taxonomy, this researcher 
recommends operational testing of the taxonomy. Operational testing would allow one 
to use actual incident information to test the taxonomy, which moves forward from 
examining the concepts behind the taxonomy. Operational testing would further validate 
the taxonomy, as well as increase its exposure to, and possible acceptance by, the 
Internet security community. 
64 
To facilitate the use of the computer and network attack taxonomy, this 
researcher recommends development of a standard information collection process for 
Internet security activity. The development of a standard process would help all 
interested parties focus on the same kinds of information and probably lead to a 
common language too. In addition, this process could be coordinated with the 
maintainers of the computer and network taxonomy. This coordination would facilitate 
the taxonomy's use and acceptance by the Internet security community and ensure the 
information collection process collects the appropriate information necessary for the 
taxonomy. 
By using prototyping and Rapid Application Development, which is a "systems 
development methodology created to radically decrease the time needed to design an 
implement information systems" (Hoffer, George, Valacich, 1998:835), that also benefits 
from "extensive user involvement" (lbid.:835), a standard form can be developed, as 
shown in Appendix M, in a relatively quick fashion. The recommended standard form 
uses the common elements found on the business forms used by the CERTs analyzed 
for this study. Next, it includes all the distinct elements of Howard's 1998 taxonomy, 
because this version appeared to be the preferred version based on this study. By 
combining these two data sets, the CERTs can explicitly capture an abundance of 
information about computer and network attacks, plus the collected information would be 
appropriate as input into the computer and network attack taxonomy. In addition, the 
design of the form allows computer programmers to quickly convert the format into a 
functional database. Each line item on page 1 and each element on page 2 can map 
one-to-one to a database field, thus allowing the CERTs to better automate, analyze, 
and report on the status of Internet security activity. Finally, concerning flexibility for the 
uniqueness of the CERTs, each organization can add data elements as they deem 
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necessary. This allows the organizations to tailor the form to conform to any specific 
requirements they have. However, it is important that the standard sections of the form, 
in this case pages one and two, not be modified without total agreement from all the 
CERTs and the taxonomy developers. These sections represent the information that 
should be common across the board. 
Finally, congruent to the development of a standard information collection 
process, an information release process should be developed. Taking into account the 
security and liability concerns, a process should be developed to help interested parties 
with valid reasons gain access to the collected data. Without access to this data, 
examining successes and areas of improvements will remain difficult. 
Conclusion 
This researcher concludes that Howard's 1997 and 1998 computer and network 
attack taxonomies are satisfactory, based upon the results of the questionnaires. The 
respondents did appear to agree with the 1998 taxonomy more than the 1997 taxonomy. 
It appears that the 1998 taxonomy appears to have addressed many of the areas of 
improvement comments submitted for the 1997 taxonomy. 
In addition, this researcher concludes that there appears to be a disconnect 
between the organizations responsible for collecting Internet security data and the 
developers of the taxonomy. The organizations do collect some information that can be 
used as inputs to the taxonomy, but not all. If the taxonomies are to become accepted 
and used, then the data collectors and the taxonomy developers should coordinate their 
efforts. 
Similarly, it appears that the organizations collecting information have not 
advanced past the early days of simply collecting an abundance of abstract information, 
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then trying to manually make sense of it all. Although this study indicated that problems 
still exist with distinguishing between different types of computer and network attacks 
and incidents, sufficient information technological resources exist to help these 
organizations collect and analyze this information better. Asking more direct questions 
of the victims to get the specifics, incorporating better database designs to store and 
retrieve the information, and using information technology as an enabler to help analyze 
this information would help move not only the information collection, but also the 
information dissemination process, move forward. 
Along the same line of thought, this researcher concludes that a standard 
method for collecting computer and network attack information does not exist. The 
responsible organizations do not use a standard form to collect computer and network 
attack information, which results in each organization collecting similar, but not totally the 
same type of information. Without standardization, these organizations will continue to 
collect information concerning computer and network attacks and incidents in a 
haphazard fashion, which probably fuels the lack of a common language problem 
discussed in this study. 
Finally, although the organizations gather information, this researcher concludes 
that without access to actual computer and network attack data, the ability to 
operationally test the taxonomies will continue to be difficult. The data collectors appear 
to be gathering valuable information about computer and network attacks. The 
computer and network attack taxonomy developers appear to have a model that some 
computer security professional agree with. Yet, obtaining the data to take the next 
testing step, operational testing, continues to be difficult. Operational testing will add to 
the validity of the model. 
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Appendix A -1997 Computer and Network Taxonomy Questionnaire 
This questionnaire supports the thesis, An Analysis of the Computer and Network 
Attack Taxonomy, written by Captain Richard C. Daigle, graduate student in the 
Information Resource Management degree program. Read the background information 
on Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy and then proceed to the 
questionnaire. Your contributions will be used to analyze the satisfactory usefulness of 

















































Vandals Data Tap 
(Howard, Analysis, 1997: 73) 
Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy 
Howard developed the computer and network attack taxonomy as part of his 
dissertation, An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1995, which he 
submitted to Carnegie Mellon University, as part of his requirements for the Doctor of 
Philosophy degree in Engineering and Public Policy on 7 April 1997. The taxonomy was 
not peer reviewed or analyzed by anyone outside of himself and his committee. As 
such, the taxonomy does not represent an accepted model. However, it formed the 
basis for Howard's research and it has been referenced in at least two publications: 
a. 1998 Sandia National Laboratories report, A Common Language for 
Computer Security Incidents by John D. Howard and Thomas A. Longstaff 
b. 2000 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute Technical Report, State 
of the Practice of Intrusion Detection Technologies by Julia Allen, et al. 
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The following background information comes from a compilation of extracts from 
Howard's research: 
This taxonomy depicts a simplification of the path an attacker must take in order to 
accomplish the attacker's objectives. To be successful, an attacker must find one 
or more paths that can be connected, perhaps simultaneously. 
Howard defined computer security as: 
Computer security is preventing attackers from achieving objectives 
through unauthorized access or unauthorized use of computers and 
networks. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:50) 
As the formal definition of computer security presented indicates computer security 
is preventing attackers from achieving objectives by making any complete 
connections through the steps depicted. More specifically, computer security 
efforts are aimed at the five blocks of the taxonomy. 
A popular and simple taxonomy of computer and network security attacks is a list 
of single, defined terms. Variations of this approach include lists of categories. 
There are several problems that limit the usefulness of these approaches including 
1) the terms not being mutually exclusive, 2) an exhaustive list being difficult to 
develop and unmanageably long, 3) the definitions of individual terms being difficult 
to agree on, and 4) there being no structure to the categories. 
An alternate categorization method is to structure the categories into a matrix. The 
procedure for classification using these taxonomies, however, is not unambiguous 
when actual attacks are classified. In addition, the logic is not intuitive, and the 
classifications are limited in their usefulness. 
The taxonomy developed as part of this research does not attempt to enumerate 
all computer security flaws, or to enumerate all possible methods of attack, but 
rather to reorient the focus of the taxonomy toward a process, rather than a single 
classification category. 
The final taxonomy presented was developed from the specific definition of 
computer security.. .from the criticisms of the current taxonomies, and from a 
process or operational viewpoint. From this viewpoint, an attacker on computers or 
networks attempts to link to ultimate objectives or motivations. This link is 
established through an operational sequence of tools, access, and results that 
connects these attackers to their objectives... 
The taxonomy "does not attempt to enumerate all computer security flaws, or to 
enumerate all possible methods of attack, but rather attempts to provide a broad, 
inclusive framework. The intention was to reorient the focus of the taxonomy 
toward a process, rather than a single classification category, in order to provide 
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both an adequate classification scheme for Internet attacks, and also a taxonomy 
that would aid in thinking about computer and network security". 
Extracted from An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1995, by 
John D. Howard, http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html. 
The following information further helps you understand the five categories of the 
computer and network attack taxonomy: 
ATTACKERS 
1.   Attacker represents the people that attack computer and network services. 
a. Hackers - break into computers primarily for the challenge and status 
of obtaining access. 
b. Spies - break into computers primarily for information which can be 
used for political gain. 
c. Terrorists - break into computers primarily to cause fear which will aid 
in achieving political gain. 
d. Corporate Raiders - employees of one company break into computers 
of competitors for financial gain. 
e. Professional Criminals - break into computers for personal financial 
gain (not as a corporate raider). 
f. Vandals - break into computers primarily to cause damage. 
TOOLS 
2.   Tools used to exploit computer and network vulnerabilities. 
a. User Command - the attacker enters commands at a command line or 
graphical user interface. 
b. Script or Program - scripts and programs initiated at the user interface 
to exploit vulnerabilities. 
c. Autonomous Agent - the attacker initiates a program, or program 
fragment, which operates independently from the user to exploit 
vulnerabilities. 
d. Toolkit - the attacker uses a software package which contains scripts, 
programs, or autonomous agents that exploit vulnerabilities. 
e. Distributed Tool - the attacker distributes tools to multiple hosts, which 
are then coordinated to perform an attack on the target host 
simultaneously after some time delay. 
f. Data Tap - where the electromagnetic radiation from a cable carrying 
network traffic, or from a host computer is "listened" to by a device 
external to the network or computer. 
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ACCESS 
3.   Access used to breach computer and network services. 
a. Vulnerability - a flaw that the attacker exploits to obtain unauthorized 
access or use of the computer and network services. 
b. Unauthorized access and use - Per Howard: 
Because I felt that it was more important to emphasize the 
unauthorized nature of an attacker's activities, I chose to use the 
first pair of terms (unauthorized access and unauthorized use), but 
it should be understood that unauthorized use implies authorized 
access. In addition, it should be understood that unauthorized 
access implies that this access will result in an unauthorized use. 
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:50) 
Both the means used to gain unauthorized access or use...as well 
as the ends of attacks.. .are included [in the computer security 
definition] because they require unauthorized access or 
unauthorized use. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:51) 
c. Processes, files and data in transit - protected resources which are 
the targets of the attackers, both individually and collectively. 
RESULTS 
4.   Results of attack once the attackers obtains access to the protected 
resources and exploits the vulnerabilities. 
a. Corruption of Information - any unauthorized alteration of files stored 
on a host computer or data in transit across a network. 
b. Disclosure of Information - the dissemination of information to anyone 
who is not authorized to access that information. 
c. Theft of Service - the unauthorized use of computer or network 
services without degrading the service to other users. 
d. Denial-of-service - the intentional degradation or blocking of computer 
or network resources. 
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OBJECTIVES 
5.   Objectives or primary motivations of the attackers gleaned from attacker 
categories. 
a. Challenge or Status - objective of hackers 
b. Political Gain - objective of spies and terrorists 
c. Financial Gain - objective of corporate raiders and professional 
criminals 
d. Damage - objective of vandals 
According to Howard, a satisfactory taxonomy "should have classification 
categories with the following characteristics" (53): 
1. Mutually exclusive - classifying in one category excludes all others because 
categories do not overlap 
2. Exhaustive - taken together, the categories include all possibilities 
3. Unambiguous - clear and precise so that classification is not uncertain, 
regardless of who is classifying 
4. Repeatable - repeated applications result in the same classification, 
regardless of who is classifying 
5. Accepted - logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved 
6. Useful - can be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry. (53) 
Therefore, based upon the five category descriptions and the satisfactory taxonomy 
definition, please complete the following questionnaire to determine the degree that you 
agree with the assessment that the computer and network attack taxonomy is 
satisfactory. Since a taxonomy approximates reality, it may be limited in some of the 
characteristics. 
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Please answer the questions and short answers below. If you select Disagree or 
Strongly Disagree for questions 1 through 6, please provide an explanation. 
Date: 
Primary Air Force Specialty or corresponding job description (i.e. Communications- 







1.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
2.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
EXHAUSTIVE. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
3.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
4.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
REPEATABLE. 
D □ D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
5.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
ACCEPTED. 
D D D □ 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
6.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
USEFUL. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
Proceed to the next page. 
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7.   Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack 
taxonomy that you observed. 







Please return the questionnaire to richard.daiqle@afit.af.mil. 
Thank you for your time and support. 
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Appendix B -1997 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire Summaries 
This appendix contains the cumulative information obtained from the computer 
and network attack questionnaire. Table 12 lists all the respondents' comments, 
verbatim. Per the questionnaire's instructions, if the respondents selected Disagree or 
Strongly Disagree to questions 1 through 6, this researcher requested comments 
explaining their decision. 
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Table 13 lists all the respondents' suggested areas of improvements for the taxonomy, 
verbatim. 
Table 12 -1997 Questionnaire Disagree and Strongly Disagree Comments 
1. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.  
• A hacker for example can do thing for more than one reason, i.e. for noteriety and 
financial gain. 
• As explicitly defined, I can see clear distinctions between them (e.g. terrorist vs. corp. 
raider). However, nothing seems to preclude one attacker from "wearing 2 or more 
hats." For example, and using Mr. Howard's definitions, a terrorist may perform some 
"vandal"-ism (break in to computers to cause damage) for the express purpose of 
supporting his political objectives. Related would be a Corporate Raider who, in order to 
achieve financial gain (maybe win a lucrative contract) for his corporation, may hire a 
Professional Criminal to break into a competitor's system and cause damage (act as a 
"vandal") so as to improve the corporation's position relative to the competitor. It seems 
that either through employment of various tactics or enlistment of an intermediary an 
attacker can function on/across multiple "levels" and break the exclusivity of this 
taxonomy. 
• For the "Attackers" category, there is (or can be) overlap between vandals and every 
other groups except for spies (they don't want you to know they were there). For 
example, a corporate raider can gain by damaging a competitors website - would that 
be a corporate raider or a vandal? For the "Tools" category, there is overlap between 
several tools. For example, a toolkit (or distributed tool) is made up of autonomous 
agents and/or scripts or programs. There may also be overlap in the "Objectives" 
 category akin to that in the "Attackers" category.  
2. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
EXHAUSTIVE.  
• As described, this doesn't appear to account for attacks prosecuted as, or during, an act 
of war. Where do military operations (for whatever National Objective) fit in? Also as 
described, the ACCESS issue describes general points of system vulnerability; but fails 
to addess other means of "unauthorized use/access" (e.g. social engineering) that can 
defeat protected systems. 
• Computers and Networks can be attacked by external means as well (microwave 
pulses, etc). Isn't that another tool terrorists could sue to impact comm networks. 
• Social engineering should be part of the "Tools" category. 
• Unsure how Denial of Service types of attacks would fit in the Access category. Also 
 need a category for physical access.  
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3. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
UNAMBIGUOUS.  
• What if the financial gain of one company also causes damage? Under which one is it 
catagorized then? 
• Different people may classify differently because of the "mutually exclusive" problems 
identified above. 
• There might be existing toolkits that operate in a distributed fashion - so would it be 
 classified as under the "toolkit" category, or the "distributed tool" category?  
4. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
REPEATABLE. 
• What if the financial gain of one company also causes damage? Under which one is it 
catagorized then? 
• Don't know if it's repeatable. I'm a comm officer and the taxonomy seems logical 
enough, but the common user may not come to the same conclusion. Perhaps this is a 
test within itself. 
• Since there is a problem with ambiguity, there would also be a problem with 
repeatability.  
The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
ACCEPTED.  
• I don't agree with the term 'Accepted'. I believe it's acceptable, but using the word 
accepted within your argument may assert a precedent that will later call the study into 
question. Side note: I think you may gain some utility in breaking this questionnaire out 
to test each of the categories.  
The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
USEFUL.  
• No comments.   
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Table 13 -1997 Taxonomy Suggested Areas of Improvement 
7.   Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack taxonomy 
that you observed. 
Category Area of Improvement 
Attackers • Could also be "insiders", Users that accidentally cause damage to a 
system through ignorance, or "script kiddies" that are not quite 
hackers. 
• Needs to include the role of the warfighter. Again, the problem is of 
exclusivity since we (as a warfighter) may act to corrupt (e.g. for a 
deception), steal (e.g. critical technologies or codes), DOS (extend an 
adversay OODA loop and diminish positive control of its forces). 
• Another overlooked "attacker" is the activist-has political motivations 
like a Terrorist but without the fear factor. 
• Might want to include dummies. Computer security should also limit 
damage caused by authorized users making stupid decisions or taking 
stupid actions. 
• I'm not sure how to solve the problem with vandals overlapping with 
more than one group. Possibly break each group into benign and 
malignant types. For example, hackers and crackers. 
• Need to look at the Nation/State IW aspect. Also some consideration 
of inadvertent attacks by authorized insiders-a big problem in the Air 
Force. 
Tools • Could also add packet sniffer. 
• This is usually a multi-step process involving many tools. This model 
would seem to indicate choosing one or another. The real world 
doesn't work like that. 
• Social Engineering (SE) is a tool employed to gain unauthorized 
access. It is also a point of vulnerability...I'm unsure how/where to 
delineate SE. 
• Needs to acknowledge that sometimes (see "processes" comment 
within the Access category below) use of tools are not necessary. 
• Ensure people understand that attackers are not limited to the tools 
that line up with their respective blocks. All unauthorized personnel 
make use of the same tools to achieve their different objectives. 
• Not mutually exclusive. Toolkit seems to be an 'All of the above' 
category. 
• This category focused only on the technical aspects of computer and 
network attack. There are many instances where people give out user 
IDs and passwords to intruders so that no "tool" as defined in this 
taxonomy is required. 
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7.   Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack taxonomy 
that you observed.  
Category Area of Improvement 
Access Social Engineering is a significant point of vulnerability 
As far as "processes" go, I think this is too limited. It refers to 
"protected" resources. What about when information is errantly or 
inadvertently "made available." It may be that an "attacker" doesn't 
even have to conduct an attack to get information, if that's what is 
desired.... 
The access referred to here is unclear. Vulnerability seems to be how 
the attacker gets in, while unathorized access and use describes what 
the attacker is doing, and processes, files, and data in transit refer to 
what the attacker is after. The AF categorizes "Access" into root and 
user-level access. 
I would expect this to address the fact that DoS attacks can be 
successful without ever gaining "access" to resources under control of 
the target.  
Results Another possible result is Financial Loss, or loss of customer goodwill. 
An attacker may "posturing" (e.g. creating backdoors, positioning tools, 
etc.) himself to take some later action without conducting one of the 
listed "results." 
The view presented in the taxonomy is one of immediacy. It needs to 
consider the concept of investment as a potential desire or action of an 
attacker to achieve long-term gain. 
Consider adding permanent destruction of information. I know it can 
fall under corruption, but I think there is a significant difference 
between manipulating data and destroying data. A manipulation can 
force a competitor's hand, whereas destruction can result in a closing 
or worse. 
Theft of service and denial of service are very similar. By stealing 
bandwidth, even if you do not affect the users on line, other users may 
not be able to gain access. This is hard to ascertain.  
Objectives Seems like there are more objectives than just these few. 
Again, not mutaully exclusive in this area. 
Distinction is made between personal and corporate financial gain in 
defining an attacker; why not make the distinction regarding the 
intended objective. 
Including the warfighter as an attacker will impact this area. Politial 
gain could be adapted to include National Objectives, but it seems 
other changes would also be required. 
For the Dummies category, the objective would most likely be 
authorized use. 
Again, the comments from the "Attacker" category apply here. 
May also consider attacks with no well thought-out motivation, 
objectives may be entertainment or education, even "none".  
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Appendix C -1998 Computer and Network Taxonomy Questionnaire 
This questionnaire supports the thesis, An Analysis of the Computer and Network 
Attack Taxonomy, written by Captain Richard C. Daigle, graduate student in the 
Information Resource Management degree program. Read the background information 
on Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy and then proceed to the 
questionnaire. Your contributions will be used to analyze the satisfactory usefulness of 
the computer and network attack taxonomy, as defined by Mr. John D. Howard. Please 







































































(Howard and Longstaff, 1998: 16) 
Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy 
Howard developed this taxonomy as part of a collaborative effort with Security 
and Networking Research Group at the Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore CA, 
and the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. The 
taxonomy and resulting work was published in the 1998 Sandia National Laboratories 
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report, A Command Language for Computer Security Incidents by John D. Howard and 
Thomas A. Longstaff, posted on the CERT®/CC web site at 
http://www.cert.org/research/taxonomy_988667.pdf. 
The following background information comes from a compilation of extracts from 
Howard's research: 
This taxonomy depicts a simplification of the path an attacker must take in order to 
accomplish the attacker's objectives. To be successful, an attacker must find one 
or more paths that can be connected, perhaps simultaneously. 
Howard defined computer security as: 
Computer security is preventing attackers from achieving objectives 
through unauthorized access or unauthorized use of computers and 
networks. (50) 
As the formal definition of computer security presented indicates computer security 
is preventing attackers from achieving objectives by making any complete 
connections through the steps depicted. More specifically, computer security 
efforts are aimed at the five blocks of the taxonomy. 
A popular and simple taxonomy of computer and network security attacks is a list 
of single, defined terms. Variations of this approach include lists of categories. 
There are several problems that limit the usefulness of these approaches including 
1) the terms not being mutually exclusive, 2) an exhaustive list being difficult to 
develop and unmanageably long, 3) the definitions of individual terms being difficult 
to agree on, and 4) there being no structure to the categories. 
An alternate categorization method is to structure the categories into a matrix. The 
procedure for classification using these taxonomies, however, is not unambiguous 
when actual attacks are classified. In addition, the logic is not intuitive, and the 
classifications are limited in their usefulness. 
The taxonomy developed as part of this research does not attempt to enumerate 
all computer security flaws, or to enumerate all possible methods of attack, but 
rather to reorient the focus of the taxonomy toward a process, rather than a single 
classification category. 
The final taxonomy presented was developed from the specific definition of 
computer security.. .from the criticisms of the current taxonomies, and from a 
process or operational viewpoint. From this viewpoint, an attacker on computers or 
networks attempts to link to ultimate objectives or motivations. This link is 
established through an operational sequence of tools, access, and results that 
connects these attackers to their objectives... 
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The taxonomy "does not attempt to enumerate all computer security flaws, or to 
enumerate all possible methods of attack, but rather attempts to provide a broad, 
inclusive framework. The intention was to reorient the focus of the taxonomy 
toward a process, rather than a single classification category, in order to provide 
both an adequate classification scheme for Internet attacks, and also a taxonomy 
that would aid in thinking about computer and network security". 
Extracted from An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1995, by 
John D. Howard, http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html. 
The following information further helps you understand the computer and network attack 
taxonomy: 
Overarching Groupings 
1. Incident - a group of attacks that can be distinguished from other attacks because of 
the distinctiveness of the attackers, attacks, objectives, sites, and timing. 
2. Attack(s) - a series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve an unauthorized result. 
3. Event - an action directed at a target which is intended to result in a change of state 
(status) of the target. 
ATTACKERS 
1.  Attacker represents an individual who attempts one or more attacks in order to 
achieve an objective. 
a. Hackers - break into computers primarily for the challenge and status of 
obtaining access. 
b. Spies - break into computers primarily for information which can be used for 
political gain. 
c. Terrorists - break into computers primarily to cause fear which will aid in 
achieving political gain. 
d. Corporate Raiders - employees of one company break into computers of 
competitors for financial gain. 
e. Professional Criminals - break into computers for personal financial gain (not 
as a corporate raider). 
f. Vandals - break into computers primarily to cause damage. 
g. Voyeurs - attackers who attack computers for the thrill of obtaining sensitive 
information. 
TOOLS 
2.   Tools used to exploit computer and network vulnerabilities. 
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a. Physical Attack - a means of physically stealing or damaging a computer, 
network, its components, or its supporting systems (such as air conditioning, 
electric power, etc.). 
b. Information Exchange - a means of obtaining information either from other 
attackers (such as through an electronic bulletin board), or from the people 
being attacked (commonly called social engineering). 
c. User Command - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands 
to a process through direct user input at the process interface. 
d. Script or Program - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering 
commands to a process through the execution of a file of commands (script) 
or a program at the process interface. 
e. Autonomous Agent - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by using a program, 
or program fragment, which operates independently from the user. 
f. Toolkit - the attacker uses a software package which contains scripts, 
programs, or autonomous agents that exploit vulnerabilities. 
g. Distributed Tool - a tool that can be distributed to multiple hosts, which can 
then be coordinated to anonymously perform an attack on the target host 
simultaneously after some time delay. 
h. Data Tap - a means of monitoring the electromagnetic radiation emanating 
from a computer or network using an external device. 
VULNERABILITY 
3.   A weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action 
a. Design - a vulnerability inherent in the design or specification of hardware or 
software whereby even a perfect implementation will result in a vulnerability. 
b. Implementation - a vulnerability resulting from an error made in the software 
or hardware implementation of a satisfactory design. 
c. Configuration - a vulnerability resulting from an error in the configuration of a 
system, such as having system accounts with default passwords, having 
"world write" permission for new files, or having vulnerable services enabled. 
ACTION 
4.  A weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action 
a. Probe - access a target in order to determine its characteristics. 
b. Scan - access a set of targets sequentially in order to identify which targets 
have a specific Characteristic. 
c. Flood - access a target repeatedly in order to overload the target's capacity. 
d. Authenticate - present an identity of someone to a process and, if required, 
verify that identity, in Order to access a target. 
e. Bypass - avoid a process by using an alternative method to access a target. 
f. Spoof - masquerade by assuming the appearance of a different entity in 
network communications. 
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g.   Read - obtain the content of data in a storage device, or other data medium. 
h.   Copy - reproduce a target leaving the original target unchanged. 
i.    Steal - take possession of a target without leaving a copy in the original 
location, 
j.    Modify - change the content or characteristics of a target, 
k.   Delete - remove a target, or render it irretrievable. 
TARGET H 
A computer or network logical entity (account, process, or data) or physical entity, 
(component, computer, network or internetwork). 
a. Account - a domain of user access on a computer or network which is 
controlled according to a record of information which contains the user's 
account name, password and use restrictions. 
b. Process - a program in execution, consisting of the executable program, the 
program's data and stack, its program counter, stack pointer and other 
registers, and all other information needed to execute the program. 
c. Data - representations of facts, concepts, or instructions in a manner suitable 
for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic 
means. Data can be in the form of files in a computer's volatile or non- 
volatile memory, or in a data storage device, or in the form of data in transit 
across a transmission medium. 
d. Component - one of the parts that make up a computer or network. 
e. Computer - a device that consists of one or more associated processing 
units and peripheral units, that is controlled by internally stored programs, 
and that can perform substantial computations, including numerous arithmetic 
operations, or logic operations, without human intervention during execution. 
Note: may be stand alone, or may consist of several interconnected units. 
f. Network - an interconnected or interrelated group of host computers, 
switching elements, and interconnecting branches. 
q.   Internetwork - a network of networks. 
UNAUTHORIZED RESULT 
6.   Unauthorized results are an unauthorized consequence of an event. 
a. Increased Access - an unauthorized increase in the domain of access on a 
computer or network. 
b. Disclosure of Information - the dissemination of information to anyone who is 
not authorized to access that information. 
c. Corruption of Information - unauthorized alteration of data on a computer or 
network. 
d. Denial of Service - the intentional degradation or blocking of computer or 
network resources. 
e. Theft of Resources - the unauthorized use of computer or network resources. 
84 
OBJECTIVES 
7.   The purpose or end goal of an incident. 
a. Challenge, Status, Thrill - objective of hackers and voyeurs 
b. Political Gain - objective of spies and terrorists 
c. Financial Gain - objective of corporate raiders and professional criminals 
d. Damage - objective of vandals 
According to Howard, a satisfactory taxonomy "should have classification 
categories with the following characteristics" (53): 
a. Mutually exclusive - classifying in one category excludes all others because 
categories do not overlap 
b. Exhaustive - taken together, the categories include all possibilities 
c. Unambiguous - clear and precise so that classification is not uncertain, 
regardless of who is classifying 
d. Repeatable - repeated applications result in the same classification, 
regardless of who is classifying 
e. Accepted - logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved 
f. Useful - can be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry. (53) 
Therefore, based upon the five category descriptions and the satisfactory taxonomy 
definition, please complete the following questionnaire to determine the degree that you 
agree with the assessment that the computer and network attack taxonomy is 
satisfactory. Since a taxonomy approximates reality, it may be limited in some of the 
characteristics. 
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Please answer the questions and short answers below. If you select Disagree or 
Strongly Disagree for questions 1 through 6, please provide an explanation. 
•    Date: 
Primary Air Force Specialty or corresponding job description (i.e. Communications- 







1.  The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
2.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
EXHAUSTIVE. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
3.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
4.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
REPEATABLE. 
D □ D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
5.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
ACCEPTED. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
6.   The computer and network attack taxonomy 
meets the described characteristics of 
USEFUL. 
D D D D 
If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments: 
Proceed to the next page. 
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7.   Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack 
taxonomy that you observed. 










Please return the questionnaire to richard.daiqle@afit.af.mil. 
Thank you for your time and support. 
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Appendix D -1998 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire Summaries 
This appendix contains the cumulative information obtained from the 1998 
computer and network attack questionnaire. Table 14 lists all the respondents' 
comments, verbatim. Per the questionnaire's instructions, if the respondents selected 
Disagree or Strongly Disagree to questions 1 through 6, this researcher requested 
comments explaining their decision. Table 14 lists all the respondents' suggested areas 
of improvements for the taxonomy, verbatim. 
Table 14 -1998 Questionnaire Disagree and Strongly Disagree Comments 
1. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.  
• Internal users "attack" networks more often than external attackers, sometimes they 
do it unknowingly sometimes with ulterior motives. I guess it depends on what your 
definition of an attack is. Perhaps your taxonomy should include such a definition. 
• Objectives are not neccesarily mutually exclusive. An atacker for example could be 
doing it for finacial gain and noteriety, 
2. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
EXHAUSTIVE.  
• While overarching, nothing can possibly include ALL possibilities 
3. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
UNAMBIGUOUS.  
• Some actions specifically can be classified differently by different people, 
depending on their own interpretation 
4. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
REPEATABLE.  
• See previous comments on differing interpretations 
5. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of 
ACCEPTED.  
• No comments. 




Table 15 -1998 Taxonomy Suggested Areas of Improvement 
7.   Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack taxonomy 
that you observed. 
Category Area of Improvement 
Attackers • Much better than the last. I believe all bases are covered and they 
all make sense. 
• Good Coverage - Skill level of the attacker would not be important 
to the process 
• Since there is a distinctin between hackers and crackers, it might 
warrant mentioning. 
• Note that there are fine lines for which an attacker can move into 
another name, for instance, voyeurs, if they do more than watch, 
miqht become one of the other classifications. 
Tools • I still see some overlap between toolkit and the Tools that make up 
the toolkit. 
• Data Tap can also include monitoring electrical usage of key 
components to determine complexity of access codes. Also known 
as Differential Power Analysis (Denning 1999) 
• "Process interface" - does this mean the computer directly? I'm 
assuming it means something more broad so that "computer" isn't a 
narrowing of scope. 
Vulnerability • Complete as is 
• Worth mentioning that "configuration" is attributable to the human 
factor. Specifically, a system can have superior design and 
implementation, but still be vulnerable because humans used 
incorrect configuration - the only as strong as the weakest link 
concept. 
Action • Good 
• No changes needed 
• As noted, differing interpretations can lead to different action 
classifications. Detailed explanations for each action area can 
alleviate this problem. 
Target • Good 




• No changes needed 
Objectives • Good 
• No changes needed 
• These are not neccesarily mutually exclusive objectives. 
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Appendix E - AFCERT Base Incident Response Checklist 
If you suspect or know a system is compromised, please follow these procedures and 
complete the form. 
DON'T 
• Finger attempt to access the source, or contact the source. 
• Change the system files on the suspected/compromised system. 
• Connect to the system over the network. 
DO 
• Unplug the machine from the network (if mission will allow). 
• Log-on as root at the console and do a complete dump of the system (i.e., on 
Unix, dd if="harddrive"of="tapedrive" bks=32k). Make sure you don't alter 
any files on the system. 
• Place the dump in a secure location. 
• Place the suspected/compromised system in a secure place. (Limit access to the 
system). 
• Complete the following and contact the AFCERT at DSN 969-3156 or 1-800-851- 
0187: 




d. DSN Phone Number: 
e. Commercial Phone Number: 
f. Position (system administrator, security manager, etc.): 
g. MAJCOM: 
h.   E-Mail Address: 
i.    Message Address: 
j.    Mailing Address: 
2. Target Information (if additional targets use separate sheet): 
a. Network Domain Name (i.e., afcert.csap.af.mil): 
b. IP Address (i.e., 132.28.145.43): 
c. Computer Model (i.e., Sun SparcStation 10): 
d. Operating System/Version (SUN-OS 4.1.6 etc.): 
e. Security Mode of Operation (dedicated, system high, multilevel etc.): 
f. Security Classification (i.e., SBU, secret, etc.): 
g. Network/System Mission (i.e., administration, C2, communications, logistics, 
Domain Name Server, etc.): 
h. Network Structure/Type: 
i. How Detected: 
j. Impact on Mission (if compromised): 
k. AIS Auditing: 
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3. Attack Session Information (correlates with the target information): 
(if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't access system files) 
a. Date/dates of the Session: 
b. Time: 
c. Attack Method: 
d. Success: 
e. Account (Include host name if available): 
f. First Layer Point of Origin IP: 
4. Brief Scenario (Description of incident): 
5. Countermeasure(s) Installed (e.g., patches, top wrappers, shadow passwords, etc.) 
a.   Name and date installed (if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't 
access system files): 
6. Notification Checklist (Indicate full name and rank, date, and time notified): 
a. Computer System Security Officer (CSSO): 
b. Operation Commander: 
c. Designated Approving Authority (DAA): 
d. Wing IP Office: 
e. MAJCOM IP Office: 
f. Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team: 
(AFCERT, Checklist, 2000) 
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Appendix F - AFCERT Malicious Logic Report Format 
1. Reporting period: 





3. Malicious logic name (complete section 3a-e for each malicious logic detect d): 
a. Number of infections detected by system mission criticality and point of detection: 
TYPE SYSTEM* # Detected Before Infection # Detected 
After 
Infection 




*Criticality IAW AFMAN 10-401 
b. Number of work hours expended: 
c. Operating system and version: 
d. List standard system(s) affected (if applicable, i.e., GCCS, CAMS, FAMS): 
e. Source of infection, if known: 
 AF software 
 COTS or outside source 
 Personal disks 
 Downloaded files 
(AFCERT, Report, 2000; AFSSI 5021, 1996:15) 
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Appendix G - ACERT Intrusion Submission Form 
Intrusion Response Checklist 
If you suspect or know a system is compromised, please follow these procedures and 
complete the form. 
DON'T 
Finger attempt to access the source, or contact the source. 
Change the system files on the suspected/compromised system. 
Connect to the system over the network. 
DO 
Unplug the machine from the network (if mission will allow). 
Log-on as root at the console and do a complete dump of the system 
Make sure you don't alter any files on the system. 
Place the dump in a secure location. 
Place the suspected/compromised system in a secure place. (Limit access to the 
system). 
Complete the following and contact the ACERT at DSN 235-1113 or 1-703-706- 
1113: 
Email the ACERT at: acert@liwa.belvoir.army.mil 
Or contact RCERT CONUS at DSN 879-2482 or (520) 538-2482: 
Email the RCERT at: rcert-conus@rcertc.army.mil 
1. Report Originator Information: Date:  
a. Name b. Rank/Grade  
c. Unit/Post d. DSN Phone Number  
e. Commercial Phone Number  
f. Position (system administrator, security manager, etc.) 
g. MACOM h. e-mail Address 
i. Message Address  
j. Mailing Address  
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2. Target Information (if additional targets use separate sheet): 
a. Network Domain & Host Name (i.e., liwa.belvoir.army.mil) 
b. IP Address (i.e., 132.28.145.43) Subnet 
Mask  
c. Computer Model (i.e., Sun SPARCstation 
10)  
d. Operating System/Version (SUN-OS 4.1.6 etc.) 
e. Security Mode of Operation (dedicated, system high, multilevel etc.) 
f. Security Classification (i.e., SBU, secret, etc.) 
g. Network/System Mission (i.e., administration, C2, communications, logistics, Domain 
Name Server, etc.)  
h. Network Structure/Type  
i. How 
Detected 
j. Impact on Mission (if compromised) 
k. AIS 
Auditing Yes No Type_ 
I. Firewall Yes 
 No Type_ 
m. IDS Yes 
No Type_ 
n. System Status On-line Off-line 
3. Attack Session Information (correlates with the target information): 
(if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't access system files) 
a. Date/dates and time of the Session Start: Stop  
b. Attack Method_ 
c. Source IP  
d. Source Host & Netblock name if available) Host Netblock. 
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e. Organization: (i.e.. fl3m, TheK)_ 
f. Country: 
4. Countermeasure(s) Installed (e.g., patches, TCP wrappers, shadow passwords, 
etc.) 
a. Name and date installed: 
(if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't access system files) 
5. Brief Scenario (Description of incident) 
(ACERT, Intrusion, 2001) 
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Appendix H - ACERT Virus Reporting Form 
1. PERSON REPORTING INFORMATION: 
Name: Title (ISSO/IAM/etc): 
Phone: DSN    or Commercial 
E-mail: 
Agency, Location, and MACOM: 
2. ANTI-VIRUS SOFTWARE PRODUCT INFORMATION (AT THE TIME OF INFECTION): 
AV Product Used (Norton/McAfee): 
AV Product Version and Build #: 
Scan Engine: 
Virus Definition Date: 
3. VIRUS INFORMATION: 
Name of Virus: 
Name of Infected File(s): 
Date Detected: Date Cleaned: 
Detected at (Firewall, Exchange Server, Gateway, Desktop, etc.): 
4. COMPUTER INFORMATION: 
Operating System with Version and SP #s: 
Additional Software with Ver/SP #s (Exchange Server, etc.): 
IP Address of Infected System(s): 
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5. DAMAGE REPORT: 
Source of Infection (Check as Applicable): 
 E-mail (Originator's E-mail Address - 
Download (URL ■ 
 Other 
(  
Total # of Files Infected: 
Total # of Computers Infected: 
Type of Network (NIPRNET, SIPRNET, etc.): 
Impact of Virus on Mission: 
 Total Loss Partial Loss Recovered Fully 
Lost Manhours:  
6. SYNOPSIS (Provide a description of the incident, to include identification of root cause(s) of infection 
and corrective steps taken): 
Submit to the ACERT (virus@liwa.belvoir.army.mil) with a "cc" to your supporting 
RCERT. 
(ACERT, Virus, 2001) 
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Appendix I - CERT®/CC Incident Reporting Form 
Your contact and organizational information 
1. Name...: 
2. Organization name...: 
3. Sector type (such as banking, education, energy or public safety)...: 
4. Email address...: 
5. Telephone number...: 
6. Other...: 
Affected Machine(s) 
(duplicate for each host) 
7. Hostname and IP...: 
8. Timezone...: 
9. Purpose or function of the host (please be as specific as possible)...: 
Source(s) of the Attack 
(duplicate for each host) 
10. Hostname or IP...: 
11. Timezone...: 
12. Been in contact?...: 
13. Estimated cost of handling incident (if known)...: 
14. Description of the incident (include dates, methods of Intrusion, intruder tools 
involved, software versions and patch levels, intruder tool output, details of 
vulnerabilities exploited, source of attack, or any other relevant information)...: 
(CERT®/CC, Form, 2000) 
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Appendix J - DOP CERT Incident Reporting Form 
DOD CERTDOD CERT 
Incident Reporting Form 
This form meets the initial reporting requirements outlined in CJCSI 6510.01 B, Change 
1, to report computer/network events. Please use the virus reporting form on the DOD 
CERT home page to submit detailed virus reports. Keep in mind that the security 
classification of your incident is dependent on the classification of the system affected. If 
you are unable to email this form, you may send it by FAX to 703-607-4009 (DSN: 327- 
4009). 
Report Classification (e.g., For Official Use Only) 
Warning: This is an UNCLASSIFIED system. Enter Only Unclassified Information. 
Use SIPRNet to report classified incidents. 
From:  
To:_ 
Date/Time of Report:  
Type of Incident:  
Root Level 
Name of Asset:  
Mission Impact:  
(Date & Time(ZULU) of Report (e.g. dd/mm/yyyy/hhmmZ)) 
(Probe Scan DNS Denial of Service User level Access 
Access Malicious Logic) 
Machine Name 




IP Address of Source (e.g. xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx) 




Action Taken:  
Contact Information 
Coordination: 
Router Firewall Workstation Machine Function 
Date & Time(ZULU) of Incident (e.g. dd/mm/yyyy/hhmmZ) 
IP Address of Destination (e.g. xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx) 
Reporting Classification (e.g. For Official Use Only) 
Warning Reminder: This is an UNCLASSIFIED system. 
Enter Only Unclassified Information. 
(Department of Defense, 2001) 
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Appendix K - FeDCIRC Reporting Form 
version 4.3.6 
October 1999 
Federal Computer Incident Response Capability 
(FedCIRC) 
Incident Reporting Form 
FedCIRC has developed the following form in an effort to gather incident information. If 
you believe you are involved in an incident, we would appreciate your completing the 
form below. If you do not believe you are involved in an incident, but have a question, 
send email to: 
fedcirc@fedcirc.gov 
Note that our policy is to keep any information specific to your site confidential unless we 
receive your permission to release that information. 
Return this form to: 
fedcirc@fedcirc.gov 
If you are unable to email this form, please send it by FAX. The FedCIRC FAX number 
is: 
+1 412 268 6989 






(duplicate for each host) 
hostname and IP.: 
timezone : 
Source(s) of the Attack 
(duplicate for each host) 
hostname or IP..: 
timezone : 
been in contact?: 
Description of the incident 
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(Include dates, methods of intrusion, intruder tools involved, software versions and 
patch levels, intruder tool output, details of vulnerabilities exploited, source of attack, or 
any other relevant information.) 
(FedCirc, 2001) 
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Appendix L - NAVC1RT Incident Reporting Form 
1. Incident date 
2. Physical location of the system attacked 
3. How was the attack identified 
4. How access was obtained 
5. Vulnerability exploited 
6. Actions attempted during session 
7. Highest classification of information involved 
8. Evaluation of attack success 
9. Damage or effects resulting from attack 
10. Hardware Configuration 
11. Operating System 
12. Security Software installed 
13. Origination point of incident 
14. Indication of additional activity 
15. IP address 
16. Names used 
17. Mission of system attacked (e.g. administration, command and control, message 
handling, etc.) 
18. Point of contact (e.g. name, phone number, e-mail address) 
19. Additional information 
Viruses: Those known viruses with countermeasures available in the NAVCIRT 
tool-kit should be logged and reported to FLTINFOWARCEN on a monthly basis. 
Only those viruses not known or without an available countermeasure will be 
reported [...]. 
(Department of the Navy, 1998) 
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Appendix M - Recommended Standard Information Collection Form 
*PAGE 1 OF 2* 
ORIGINATOR INFORMATION 
1. DATE OF REPORT: 
2. TIME (ZULU/GMT): 
3. REPORTERS NAME: 
4. ORGANIZATION NAME: 
5. LOCATION COUNTRY: 
6. LOCATION CITY: 
7. LOCATION STATE/PROVINCE: 




12. ADDITION INFORMATION YOU DEEM IMPORTANT: 
AFFECTED SYSTEM(S) INFORMATION 
13. DATE OF ATTACK: 
14. TIME (ZULU/GMT): 
15. HOST NAME (LIST ALL): 
16. NETWORK DOMAIN NAME (TOP.MID.DNS): 
17. IP ADDRESS (XXX.XX.XXX): 
18. COMPUTER MODEL NAMES: 
19. OPERATING SYSTEMA/ERSION: 
20. SECURITY MODE OF OPERATION: 
21. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: 
22. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION YOU DEEM IMPORTANT: 
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*PAGE 2 OF 2* 
ATTACK/INCIDENT INFORMATION 
COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY. 
THE MORE INFOMRATION, THE BETTER. 
PLEASE EXPLAIN "OTHER" SELECTION FULLY. 
1                           SELECT ALL                                        5 
ATTACKER                  THAT APPLY                                   TARGET 
SELECT ALL 
THAT APPLY 
CORPORATE RAIDER ACCOUNT 
HACKER COMPONENT 









SELECT ALL                                          6 
THAT APPLY                    UNAUTHORIZED RESULT 
SELECT ALL 
THAT APPLY 
AUTONOMOUS AGENT CORRUPTION OF INFORMATION 
DATA TAP DENIAL OF SERVICE 
DISTRIBUTED TOOL DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE INCREASED ACCESS 
PHYSICAL ATTACK THEFT OF SERVICE 






SELECT ALL                                         7 
THAT APPLY                             OBJECTIVES 
SELECT ALL 
THAT APPLY 
CONFIGURATION CHALLENGE, STATUS, THRILL 
DESIGN DAMAGE 
IMPLEMENTATION FINANCIAL GAIN 
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